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Fixing Congress
Samuel A. Marcosson*
The United States Congress is a broken, dysfunctional mess. I
would ask us to count the ways, but there are too many to count (and
more important, too many to deal with in one article).1 The aspects
of congressional disrepair upon which I intend to focus here are two* Professor of Law, University of Louisville Brandeis School of Law.
1. Of necessity, the remaining issues that plague Congress are beyond the scope of one
article. The biggest and most intractable is the problem of money, and the need of members of
Congress to raise it in ever-increasing quantities. This insatiable need for cash begins from the
start of one term and runs to the day the voters go to the polls in their next bid. Instead of
spending their time legislating, senators and representatives must spend time at fundraisers,
calling prospective donors, and doing everything they can to build a war chest to either ward off
a dangerous challenger or to win reelection if a challenger emerges. See Ryan Grim & Sabrina
Siddiqui, Call Time for Congress Shows How Fundraising Dominates Bleak Work Life,
HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 9, 2013, 7:30 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/08/calltime-congressional-fundraising_n_2427291.html. The constantly greater need for cash was
triggered by the Supreme Court’s campaign finance decisions that struck down limits on the
amount candidates could spend on their campaigns, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976),
the amount organizations (including for-profit companies) can spend on campaigns, see Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010), and the aggregate amount that a single donor could
contribute in an election cycle, see McCutcheon v. FEC, 572 U.S. 185 (2014). The explosion in
campaign expenditures—in the form of both donations to candidates’ campaign coffers and independent expenditures—has made the ability to spend money on behalf of a candidate a key
feature of how influence is exerted in Congress. See, e.g., Thomas B. Edsall, Crony Capitalism:
How the Financial Industry Gets What It Wants, HUFFINGTON POST (May 11, 2009, 5:12
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/05/11/crony-capitalsim-how-the_n_201602.html
(noting that between 2000 and 2009 the financial sector contributed over $900 million to candidates for federal office and spent over $1.8 billion in lobbying Congress and the executive
branch); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act: A Flawed and Inadequate Response to
the Too Big-To-Fail Problem, 89 OR. L. REV. 951 (2011); Mike Konczal, Rob Johnson on the
One-Year Anniversary of Dodd-Frank, RORTYBOMB (July 21, 2011), https://rortybomb.word
press.com/2011/07/21/rob-johnson-on-the-one-year-anniversary-of-dodd-frank/ (former chief
economist for Senate Banking Committee arguing that Dodd-Frank, the response to the financial collapse of 2008-09, was already a “weak bill” whose implementation was being “tied in
knots” by the influence of Wall Street). One other area of legislative disrepair is also worth a
brief mention to illustrate how poorly Congress functions: Congress has not followed its own
budget and appropriations process in a generation. See STEVE WOMACK, HOUSE BUDGET
COMMITTEE, REFORMING THE BUDGET AND APPROPRIATIONS PROCESS, (Feb. 18, 2018),
https://budget.house.gov/budget-digest/reforming-budget-appropriations-process/ (“There is
near universal agreement that the congressional budget process is broken and badly in need of
reform. Perhaps the most visible sign of failure is that Congress has not followed regular order
regarding the congressional budget and appropriations process since fiscal year 1995, the last
time Congress passed a budget conference agreement followed by all of the separate appropriations bills before the beginning of the fiscal year.”).
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fold: the inability of the House of Representatives to function because it has become an institutionalized reflection of America’s polarized politics, and the inability of the Senate to function because of its
archaic rules that preclude, or at least greatly impede, action. It is little wonder that polling results reflect both a deep cynicism among
the American people about our politics, and an even deeper loathing
for Congress as an institution.2
I come not to bury Congress, but neither to praise it. Instead, I
come to fix it. Or at least I come with proposals to accomplish that
feat. Since these ideas require constitutional change, I have no illusions that actually putting them into practice will be easy. It may not
even be possible; this is the inevitable Catch-22 of trying to fix a political system that is as broken as ours. Any fix requires some operation of the system (here, utilizing the constitutional amendment process which has always gone through Congress first), but if the system
is broken, it is unlikely to operate sufficiently to implement the fix.
Nevertheless, there is value in going beyond just exploring Congress’ deep systemic problems by also proposing concrete solutions to
deal with them, even if it is difficult to imagine the solutions actually
being enacted. The clearest picture of the depth of Congress’ problems—and what they mean for our ability to govern ourselves—
emerges when we are forced to consider what it would take to solve
them. To put it another way, our understanding of the crisis we face
becomes all the more acute when we add to the picture a discussion
of how difficult it will be to find and implement solutions.
Thus, in Part I of this article, I discuss the extent to which the
House of Representatives is beset by polarization and reduced to partisan gridlock, deeply compromising the effectiveness of democratic
decision-making. It will be evident from my discussion of a plan to
address such polarization that our options to deal with the problem
are severely limited. Then in Part II, I propose a constitutional solution to the quite different problem that causes gridlock in the Senate:
the Senate’s own rules that slow consideration of legislation to
a standstill. Again, I will discuss a proposal that I believe would solve
the problem, but which would be almost impossible to enact,
thus showing the difficulty of finding an effective solution to
2. See Ryan Struyk, Even Republicans Don’t Like Congress Anymore, CNN (Aug. 3,
2017, 5:24 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2017/08/03/politics/republicans-congress-approvaldrops/index.html (reporting on Quinnipiac poll showing that approval of Congress had sunk to
a “new low[]” of 10% in August 2017).
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congressional dysfunction. Perhaps we will take the necessary steps to
rescue Congress from its long-term decline only when we realize
both that a congressional breakdown causes a crisis for democracy,3
and that the solutions are vexing at best and unattainable at worst.

I. IT WON’T MEAN A THING ‘TIL WE BRING BACK THAT
SWING:4 COMPETITIVE DISTRICTS MAKE A BETTER
CONGRESS=
The problem of districting is, of course, specific to the House of
Representatives, since both Senators from each state are selected
statewide.5 In this modern political era, the way most states conduct
districting has contributed mightily to the partisan polarization we
see in the House.6 Too many members of the House have become
beholden only to a narrow slice of the electorate, producing a complete unwillingness (indeed, verging on an inability) to compromise

3. It is fair to say that the Framers considered Congress the most powerful and important branch under the Constitution they created. Thus, having that branch deteriorate into
ineffectiveness is nothing less than a crisis for our governing framework. No simple description
of the role the Framers intended Congress to play is possible. In one respect, the Congress created by the Constitution was less powerful than its predecessor under the Articles of Confederation, since it would have to share power with (and have some of its power checked by) the
other branches. But since the national government as a whole became substantially more powerful, Congress’ power to make law within that system became enormously important—
especially combined with the President’s duty to faithfully execute the laws Congress enacted.
4. With apologies to Duke Ellington. See DUKE ELLINGTON, IT DON’T MEAN A
THING (IF IT AIN’T GOT THAT SWING) (Brunswick Records 1932); It Don’t Mean A Thing
(If It Ain’t Got That Swing, LEARN JAZZ STANDARDS https://www.learnjazzstandards.com/jazz
-standards/it-dont-mean-a-thing-if-it-aint-got-that-swing/ (last visited Mar. 22, 2019) (describing the song as a “classic piece” and “sort of [a] theme song for the [jazz] genre itself.”).
5. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (“The Senate of the United States shall be composed of
two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator
shall have one Vote.”); U.S. CONST. amend. XVII (“The Senate of the United States shall be
composed of two Senators from each state, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each
Senator shall have one vote.”).
6. Some states have gone to a form of non-partisan or bipartisan redistricting. See Ariz.
State Legislature v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S.Ct. 2652, 2662 (2015) (rejecting
state legislature’s challenge to amendment enacted by Arizona voters to state constitution to
provide that redistricting of congressional and state legislative districts be handled by a nonpartisan commission). These approaches have been found to reduce the frequency of gerrymandered districts with polarized electorates. Id. (citing Peter Miller & Bernard Grofman, Redistricting Commissions in the Western United States, 3 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 637, 661, 663–
64, 666 (2013)); see also Bruce E. Cain, Redistricting Commissions: A Better Political Buffer?,
121 YALE L.J. 1808, 1808 (2012) (arguing that independent commissions “have not eliminated
the inevitable partisan suspicions associated with political line-drawing,” but they have “succeeded to a great degree” in “limiting the conflict of interest implicit in legislative control over
redistricting”).
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across ideological and partisan lines. The result is gridlock instead of
a functional legislature.
The district lines in too many states are drawn primarily for the
sake of partisan advantage to lock in or produce gains for the party
that happens to hold power at the time redistricting rolls around.7
This is possible because there is more than one way to divide up the
same population into districts, and each way can have very different
partisan ramifications.8 One technique available to the in-power party
is to “pack” voters it knows are likely to support the other side into as
few districts as possible—sacrificing those districts for the sake of
their own gains elsewhere. The result is that the packed districts will
be overwhelmingly partisan.9 The other typical method is to “crack”
groups of voters who typically support the out-of-power party into
separate districts where they might be 40% of the voters—not
enough to win, but only enough to be frustrated every two years as a
representative with very different views wins.10 The two methods,
packing and cracking, are usually used in combination across a particular state in a particular redistricting cycle. Whether packing or
cracking is used, the districts that result are one-sided as a matter of

7. See JOHN PAUL STEVENS, SIX AMENDMENTS: HOW AND WHY WE SHOULD
CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION 36 (2014) (urging an amendment to give federal courts authority to strike down partisan gerrymanders, which Justice Stevens describes as those in which
“a political party in control of a state government” draws district lines to “benefit[] that party by
increasing the number of elections that its candidates will win,” with resulting districts “with
bizarre shapes that prompt observers to question the motives of their architects.”). My focus
here is not on the partisan advantage gained by the districting process, but on the impact it has
on ideological and partisan polarization in Congress.
8. See Christopher Ingraham, This Is the Best Explanation of Gerrymandering You
Will Ever See, WASH. POST (Mar. 1, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk
/wp/2015/03/01/this-is-the-best-explanation-of-gerrymandering-you-will-eversee/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.044f10d905db (illustrating several redistricting options in a
state with a state divided 60/40 between “blue” and “red,” pursuant to which the “blue” party
could get a proportionate, 60% share of the seats, the blues could get all seats, or the “reds”
could get 60%).
9. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1935–36 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring) (discussing “packing” and “cracking” as the two methods of gerrymandering); Nate Cohn &
Quoctrung Bui, How the New Math of Gerrymandering Works, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/10/03/upshot/how-the-new-math-ofgerrymandering-works-supreme-court.html (“With packing, one party’s votes are concentrated
into a district, resulting in wasted votes in lopsided victories.”).
10. See Roger Parloff, Packing and Cracking: The Supreme Court Takes up Partisan
Gerrymandering, YAHOO NEWS (Oct. 2, 2017), https://www.yahoo.com/news/packingcracking-supreme-court-takes-partisan-gerrymandering-090050994.html?_tsrc=jtc_news_index
(“Cracking means dispersing the rest of the opposing party’s voters into the remaining districts,
where they are expected to be a permanent minority.”).
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ideology and partisanship.11 This result means two things. First, the
person who wins the seat is apt to contribute to polarization in
Washington, because the candidate who emerges from the primary is
likely to be the one who most strongly appeals to the party’s base,12
by running the hardest to the left or right in the campaign. The person who emerges is apt to be a strong partisan, rather than a moderating force. And second, even if the person who wins the district is
open to reaching out to seek compromise solutions, the political reality is that doing so will open him or her up to a primary challenge
two years later—and the primary is almost certain to be the only real
threat in highly partisan districts.13 In short, these districts produce
members of the House who are likely to be the strongest partisan
warriors, and even when they are not, they will be subject to powerful
political incentives to make them behave as if they are.14
During the spring and summer of 2013, stories about attempts to
pass comprehensive immigration reform illustrate the problem we
have created for ourselves. As the Senate was moving towards passage
of a bill15—a rare example of bipartisan consensus in that chamber
11. See Fred Drews, A Primer on Gerrymandering and Political Polarization,
BROOKINGS INST. (July 6, 2017), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/brookings-now/2017/07/06
/a-primer-on-gerrymandering-and-political-polarization/ (“Congressional districts . . . are
drawn in ways that make nearly all of them safe for one or another of the major political parties.
Considered in tandem with low-turnout primaries, gerrymandering further diminishes the influence of moderates.”) (quoting William A. Galson & Elaine Kamarck, Make U.S. Politics
Safe for Moderates, BROOKINGS INST. (Feb. 23, 2011), https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/
make-u-s-politics-safe-for-moderates/).
12. STEVENS, supra note 7, at 37 (“Whether liberal or conservative, candidates can be
expected to adopt more extreme positions when competing within a single party than when
competing with a member of the opposite party. I firmly believe that gerrymandering has made
our elected officials more doctrinaire and less willing to compromise with members of the opposite party.”).
13. See Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1940 (citing amicus brief filed by bipartisan group of current
and former state legislators, which discussed “a ‘cascade of negative results’ from excessive partisan gerrymandering: indifference to swing voters and their views; extreme political positioning
designed to placate the party’s base and fend off primary challenges; the devaluing of negotiation and compromise; and the impossibility of reaching pragmatic, bipartisan solutions to the
nation’s problems”) (citing Brief for Bipartisan Group of 65 Current and Former State Legislators as Amici Curiae at 6, 25, Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161)).
14. Parloff, supra note 10 (“[T]he caustic hyperpartisanship that characterizes national
politics is at least in part a result of gerrymandering, which creates a plethora of safe seats for
incumbents of both parties. Those representatives have disincentives to work across the aisle,
lest the more extreme factions of their own party field a candidate to challenge them in the
primaries—increasingly the only remaining contested elections.”).
15. See Elise Foley, Senate Immigration Reform Bill Passes With Strong Majority,
HUFFINGTON POST (June 27, 2013, 4:22 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/27/
senate-immigration-reform-bill_n_3511664.html (detailing passage of bill by vote of 68-32,
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sufficient to overcome the typical resort to the partisan filibuster16—
reports showed why the legislation would face such a difficult time in
the House, despite its strong bipartisan pedigree in the Senate.
Speaker of the House John Boehner announced that he would not allow the Senate bill to even come to the floor for a vote unless it had
the support of a majority of the House Republican caucus,17 but he
also demanded the support of a majority of the House Democratic
caucus.18 The problem with all of this is that requiring intra-party
majorities means reaching further out from the center, to the more
conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats—an ultimately selfdefeating and contradictory exercise, since the very provisions that
would appeal to the former group would be poison pills to the latter.
So why is it virtually impossible to craft a bill in the House on a
controversial issue that could command the support of a majority of
both party caucuses, so much so that the Speaker knew that imposing
such a requirement would ensure the death of the immigration bill?
Because the House itself has become so ideologically polarized along
party lines; there are virtually no left-leaning Republicans, and almost
as few conservative Democrats. The polarization has been accompanied by moves to the extremes, as the baseline for what it means to be
considered a conservative Republican has moved further to the right,
and the same is true on the other wing for liberal Democrats. This
is the recipe for a perfectly polarized legislature: no ideological overlap between the parties, combined with greater extremes defining
each party.
with bipartisan majority including fourteen Republican votes).
16. Id. (discussing features of the bill that included Democratic priorities such as a path
to citizenship for undocumented immigrants already in the United States, and Republican priorities such as “huge increases in border security, bolstered by an amendment from [GOP Senators] Corker and Hoeven that helped bring on board unsure Democrats and Republicans,”
provisions which ultimately garnered enough support to easily cross the sixty-vote threshold to
ensure that a filibuster could not succeed).
17. See Brett LoGiurato, If Boehner Isn’t Bluffing, He Probably Just Killed Immigration
Reform, BUS. INSIDER (June 27, 2013), http://www.businessinsider.com/boehner-immigrationreform-hastert-rule-conference-committee-2013-6 (quoting the Speaker that, “The House is
not going to take up and vote on whatever the Senate passes. We’re going to do our own bill,
through regular order, and it’ll be legislation that reflects the will of our majority and the will of
the American people. For any legislation—including a conference report—to pass the House,
it’s going to have to be a bill that has the support of a majority of our members.”) (emphasis
added).
18. See Russell Berman, Boehner: Immigration Bill Will Require Majority of Both Parties in the House, HILL (June 27, 2013, 4:30 PM), http://thehill.com/homenews/house/308217
-boehner-immigration-bill-needs-majority-in-both-parties (“The Speaker later emphasized
that immigration reform would need a majority of both Democrats and Republicans.”).
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In this section I first establish the extreme ideological and partisan polarization that exists in the House and show the connection
between that polarization and partisan gerrymandering. The
relationship is not neat and clean, and the causation runs both ways.
In other words, polarization has produced the conditions that result
in gerrymandering, and those gerrymandered districts have then,
in turn, added substantially to the partisan polarization in Congress
by sending to Washington ever-more-extreme members of the
House. In the second section I demonstrate that, while gerrymandering is not the sole cause of our polarized politics, ending partisan
districting (while not a panacea) will reduce the polarization we
have seen.

A. Our Polarized House of Representatives and Its Complex
Relationship to Partisan Redistricting
If there is anything that pundits and political scientists agree on,
it is that ideological polarization in Congress—and the House of
Representatives most of all—has grown exponentially in the last several decades.19 The partisan divide has become far clearer, and the
members of each party have gone further in their chosen ideological
directions (and thus further from each other). The lack of overlap between the parties, and their distance from each other, means that the
battle lines have been hardening for decades.
The Poole-Rosenthal Polarization Index measures the distance
between Republicans and Democrats in Congress and how far each
party is from the center. It can be utilized to assess whether the relationship between the parties has changed over time. “The PooleRosenthal scale, based on members’ voting records, runs from -1
(most liberal) to +1 (most conservative).”20 The scale shows a remark-

19. Drew Desilver, The Polarized Congress of Today Has Its Roots in the 1970s, PEW
RES. CTR., (June 12, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/12/polarizedpolitics-in-congress-began-in-the-1970s-and-has-been-getting-worse-ever-since/ (arguing that
“Democrats and Republicans [are] more ideologically separated than ever before”) [hereinafter
Desilver, The Polarized Congress of Today]. Desilver describes the research of political scientists Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal, which has shown a consistent trend since there was
substantial ideological overlap between the parties in the 1970s, towards very little overlap in
the 1990s, and none at all in the 112th Congress in 2011-2012.
20. Drew Desilver, Partisan Polarization, in Congress and Among Public, Is Greater
Than Ever, PEW RES. CTR. (July 17, 2013), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2013/07/
17/partisan-polarization-in-congress-and-among-public-is-greater-than-ever/ [hereinafter Desilver, Partisan Polarization].
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able trend. Over six decades, from the 1920s to the 1970s, and perhaps into the 1980s, the parties had a relatively steady ideological relationship in the House. The GOP hovered steadily between .2 and
.4—generally moderately conservative—while Democrats stayed for
the most part between -.2 and -.3—generally about as liberal as the
Republicans were conservative.21 There was, it is fair to say, stability
in the relationship between the parties and in the ideological makeup of the House.
The strong contingent of ideological moderates in both parties
up until and through the 1980s was a big reason why the relationship
between the parties remained so steady for so long. During some periods, principally from the 1920s to the mid-1950s, moderates made
up a bigger percentage of the Democratic caucus, at times approaching 80% of the Democrats in the House.22 In the 1950s, the share of
moderates in the GOP House caucus surpassed that of the Democrats and went over 50%—and even over 60% in the 1970s.23 For this
entire period, both parties had a robust moderate membership; from
the mid-1930s to the 1980s moderates constituted a minimum of
30% (usually much higher) of both parties’ caucuses. This meant, in
turn, that there was also considerable overlap between their ideological positions and the voting records of their members.
This reality—relative stability in the ideological positions of the
parties and the presence of a significant number of moderates in each
party who shared at least a reasonably high number of positions
on issues—created opportunities for coalitions and compromise
throughout most of the 20th century.24 While there were clear distinctions between the parties, there were also blurred lines, such as
the division within the Democratic Party over civil rights legisla21. See Keith Poole, Graphic Picture of a Polarized Congress, 41 UGARESEARCH 1,
32–33 (2012), https://issuu.com/ugaresearch/docs/ugaresearch_sp12?e=1854225/2617568
(graph entitled “House 1879-2011 Party Means on Liberal-Conservative Dimension”).
22. Id. (graph entitled “House 1879-2012 Percentage of Moderates (-0.25 to 0.25) in the
Parties on Liberal-Conservative Dimension”).
23. Id.
24. It is important to note that while this was the norm for most of the 20th century, it
has not always been true. We have experienced severe periods of ideological polarization before, and not all the explanations for the ideological overlap between the parties from the middle of the 20th century until the 1980s are necessarily positive. See Cynthia R. Farina, Congressional Polarization: Terminal Constitutional Dysfunction?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1689, 1702–
03 (2015) (noting the argument of some scholars that “significant levels of congressional polarization are the norm in U.S. politics,” and that “[m]id-twentieth-century lows are the anomaly, a
period when partisan conflict was suppressed by politically expedient accommodation of Southern racial repression.”).
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tion.25 Republicans provided substantial support for passage of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, including 138 essential votes in the House,
and the critical votes necessary to overcome a largely Democratic
southern filibuster in the Senate.26
But starting in the 1970s, and then accelerating quickly thereafter, this pattern unraveled. Republican moderates vanished; many
congressional Republicans had been from the Northeast, and the
GOP’s fortunes waned sharply in that part of the country.27 The
House GOP caucus came to be dominated by conservatives from the
South and West. Democratic moderates also disappeared; most of
that breed had been from the South, and Democrats became vanishingly scarce in the South,28 other than African-Americans from majority-minority districts who continued to be elected, and who were
among the most liberal in the House.29 In just a few short years, the
overlap between the parties that had been created by each side’s
moderates disappeared, and the Poole-Rosenthal scores of each party
went sharply in opposite directions. Polarization had come to the
House.30 The trend seemed to reach its apex in the 111th Congress
25. See, e.g., Kathy Kattenberg, Republican House Member Misrepresents History on
Civil Rights Legislation, MODERATE VOICE (Nov. 20, 2009), http://themoderatevoice.com/
53521/republican-house-member-misrepresents-history-on-civil-rights-legislation/(noting statistics showing that Democrats in the House split over the Civil Rights Act of 1964, with
Northern Democrats overwhelmingly supporting it, 145-9, but Southern Democrats voting 877 against it—a tally much more like Southern Republicans, who voted 10-0 against the Act).
26. H.W. Perry, Jr. & L.A. Powe, Jr., The Political Battle for the Constitution, 21
CONST. COMMENTARY 641, 661 (2004).
27. See Desilver, The Polarized Congress of Today, supra note 20 (noting the “the disappearance of moderate-to-liberal Republicans (mainly in the Northeast),” as evidenced by the
fact that the “combined House delegation of the six New England states . . . went from 15
Democrats and 10 Republicans in 1973-74 to 20 Democrats and two Republicans in 2011-12.”).
28. Id. (remarking on the disappearance of “conservative Democrats (primarily in the
South)”).
29. Remarkably, there was only one Democrat in the 113th Congress from Louisiana,
Mississippi, Alabama, South Carolina and Georgia—a reasonably good working definition of
the “Deep South”—who is not an African-American: Representative John Barrow of Georgia’s
12th District. See Moni Basu, Last White House Democrat in the Deep South Fights for Political Survival, CNN (Nov. 2, 2012), http://inamerica.blogs.cnn.com/2012/11/02/last-whitehouse-democrat-in-the-deep-south-fights-for-political-survival/. Barrow fought off a tough
challenge in 2012 (made more difficult by partisan districting that altered the district he had
represented since 2005 to make it even more amenable to a Republican candidate). Id.; see also
Daniel Malloy, Re-elected Barrow Hopes Middle Is Revived in Congress, ATLANTA J.-CONST.
(Nov. 7, 2012), http://www.ajc.com/news/news/national-govt-politics/re-elected-barrowhopes-middle-is-revived-in-congr/nSzhr/.
30. See Keith T. Poole, The Decline and Rise of Party Polarization in Congress During
the Twentieth Century, EXTENSIONS 4-6 (2005), https://legacy.voteview.com/pdf/Carl_Albert
_Extensions_essay_2005.pdf (discussing the disappearance of moderates in the House in the
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(from 2009-2011), when “for the first time in modern history, in both
the House and the Senate, the most conservative Democrat [was]
slightly more liberal than the most liberal Republican. This is another way of saying that the degree of overlap between the parties
in Congress [was] zero.”31 One might have thought that crossing
the “no ideological overlap” barrier would represent the high-water
mark in partisan polarization. But amazingly enough, the unprecedented divide in the 111th Congress became even more pronounced
in the 113th.32
No one would claim that redistricting is the principal cause of the
polarization that has consumed Capitol Hill. As noted, similar polarization occurred in the Senate,33 which knows no districts. If partisan
districting was the biggest part of the explanation for polarization, we
would have seen it occur either exclusively, or at least more emphatically, in the House.
Instead, polarization in the House (and Senate) is less the product
of systemic manipulation than it is a reflection of the wider polarization and stridency among Americans that characterizes our modern
politics,34 and the rise of divisive (or “wedge”35) issues that have increasingly fractured our politics. The issues that became so polarizing

thirty years between the 93rd and 108th Congress, and the fact that the trend towards polarization in the House showed no signs of moderating as of 2004).
31. THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, IT’S EVEN WORSE THAN IT LOOKS:
HOW THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM COLLIDED WITH THE NEW POLITICS OF
EXTREMISM 45 (2012) (citing Ronald Brownstein, The Four Quadrants of Congress,
NATIONAL JOURNAL (Feb. 5, 2010, 7:00 PM), https://www.nationaljournal.com/s/553801/four
-quadrants-congress) (emphasis added) [hereinafter MANN & ORNSTEIN, WORSE THAN IT
LOOKS].
32. See The Polarization of the Congressional Parties, VOTEVIEW (Mar. 21, 2015),
https://legacy.voteview.com/political_polarization_2014.htm (presenting graphs showing the
ideological “difference between the Republican and Democratic Party . . . from the end of Reconstruction through the first session (2013) of the 113th Congress,” and illustrating that “polarization is now at a post-Reconstruction high in the House and Senate.”).
33. See Poole, supra note 30, at 4.
34. See Desilver, Partisan Polarization, supra note 21 (discussing Pew Research Center
survey data showing sharp increase in percentages of Republicans who self-identify as “conservative,” Democrats who self-identify as “liberal,” and that the gap between Democrats and
Republicans in their opinions on a range of issues in 2013 is double what it averaged between
1987-2002).
35. See Francisco Valdes, Beyond Sexual Orientation in Queer Legal Theory: Majoritar-

ianism, Multidisciplinary, and Responsibility in Social Justice Scholarship or Legal Scholars as
Cultural Warriors, 75 DEN. U. L. REV. 1409, 1427, n.73 (1998) (defining “wedge issues” as
those that tend to “aggravate social division between ingroups and outgroup” and which “pivot
for the most part on sociolegal identities and interests derived from sexual orientation,
race/ethnicity/nationality, socioeconomic class and sex/gender.”).
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began with civil rights in the 1960s, which first fractured the Democratic Party and its hold on the South.36 Once the Democratic Party
split, and lost much of its more conservative southern wing, a partisan
realignment followed that contributed mightily to ending the overlap
between the parties.37 Other wedge issues, such as those surrounding
sexual politics (abortion, gay rights), the fight over the Vietnam War,
guns, and crime, added to the sense of polarization and division.
The increased polarization we have experienced in the last several
decades is undeniable.38 Finding precise explanations and assigning
each one an exact share of the blame is a more difficult task, and
probably an ultimately futile one, especially since there are simply too
many contributing causes to home in on any one of them as the culprit. Once the parties re-aligned into completely separate ideological
camps with far less overlap between the most conservative Democrats
and the most liberal Republicans it should probably have been reasonable to expect that the competition between them would sharpen
along ideological lines, and the resulting attacks would intensify and
increase antagonism in our political relationships. Beyond that, a society that has undergone rapid economic transformation, including
the dislocation caused by the loss of millions of manufacturing jobs39
and the transition to a service economy, is bound to experience political fallout, including intense politicization on issues that become tied

36. MANN & ORNSTEIN, WORSE THAN IT LOOKS, supra note 31, at 47–48 (discussing
the passage of historic civil rights legislation in the 1960s, the opposition to those laws by
southern Democrats, and the eventual splintering of the south away from the Democratic Party
in the 1970s and thereafter).
37. Thomas Mann, Polarizing the House of Representatives: How Much Does Gerrymandering Matter?, in PIETRO S. NIVOLA & DAVID W. BRADY, RED AND BLUE NATION?:
CHARACTERISTICS AND CAUSES OF AMERICA’S POLARIZED POLITICS 263-64 (2006) (pointing
to the breakdown of the Democratic Party’s New Deal North/South coalition in the 1960s over
issues of race, the Vietnam War, and others as a critical turning point in the move towards partisan polarization); David W. Brady & Hahrie C. Han, Polarization Then and Now: A Historical Perspective, in NIVOLA & BRADY, supra note 38, at 143 (“The transformation of the political South was one of the most striking changes in twentieth-century politics, and it undoubtedly
played a significant role in redefining – and thus repolarizing – the parties at the national level.”).
38. See James E. Campbell, Polarization Runs Deep, Even By Yesterday’s Standards, in
NIVOLA & BRADY, supra note 38, at 157–61 (setting forth statistical evidence of a “shrinking
political middle” between 1972 and 2004, with a significant decline in moderates and a corresponding rise in the percentage of Americans describing themselves as liberal or conservative).
39. See Danielle Kurtzleben, Report: America Lost 2.7 Million Jobs to China in 10
Years, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Aug. 24, 2012), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/
2012/08/24/report-america-lost-27-million-jobs-to-china-in-10-years (noting that just between
2001 and 2012, the U.S. economy shed 5.1 million manufacturing jobs).
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(rightly or wrongly, fairly or unfairly in the particulars) to jobs and
economic insecurity, such as trade40 and affirmative action.41
Of course, much has been made of the impact of the growth of
media outlets that target particular niche audiences on the left or
right as a cause of polarization. Cable news stations like FOX News
and MSNBC cannot really be an initial cause of polarization, since
polarization was already well under way before either began operations.42 After all, there must already be a polarized audience out there
for cable stations and internet sites to be targeting. But the existing
trend has been reinforced by these outlets, as they cater to the preconceived beliefs of each side of the political spectrum.43 Still, no
matter how incendiary their rhetoric and approach to political discourse, their impact in adding to polarization can easily be overstat-

40. See Sucharita Ghosh, The Causal Relationship Between International Trade and
Employment in the Manufacturing Sector of the United States, 14 INT’L TRADE J. 399 (2010)
(study finding that international trade resulted in loss of over 5% of U.S. manufacturing jobs
between 1978 and 1990); Louis Uchitelle, Here Come the Populists, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 26,
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/26/weekinreview/26uchitelle.html (describing resurgence of populist arguments for trade restrictions among Democratic constituencies, against
both the policies of the Bush administration and the views of some of the leading officials of the
Clinton administration because of the consequences of income inequality).
41. A classic case of economic insecurity being used in a deeply polarizing way on the
political issue of affirmative action was the 1990 North Carolina Senate race between incumbent Republican Jesse Helms and former Charlotte Mayor Harvey Gantt, in which the Helms
campaign ran an ad late in the race attacking Gantt’s support for affirmative action as support
for “Ted Kennedy’s racial quota law,” by showing a pair of white hands holding (and then
crumpling up) a job rejection letter, with the voiceover saying that the person “needed that job
and [was] the best qualified; but they had to give it to a minority because of a racial quota.” See
SnakesOnaBlog, Jesse Helms “Hands” Ad, YOUTUBE (Oct. 16, 2006), http://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=KIyewCdXMzk. Helms, who had been trailing in the race, ended up winning.
42. FOX News launched in 1996. See Lawrie Mifflin, At the New Fox News Channel,
the Buzzword Is Fairness, Separating News from Bias, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 1996),
https://www.nytimes.com/1996/10/07/business/at-the-new-fox-news-channel-the-buzzwordis-fairness-separating-news-from-bias.html (discussing launch of Fox News and the views of
founder Rupert Murdoch regarding the need to be “fair and balanced” by separating news coverage and opinion programming). MSNBC began targeting a progressive audience a decade
later. See Kelsey Sutton, How Trump Derailed MSNBC’s Centrist Makeover, MIC (July 28,
2017), https://mic.com/articles/182982/how-trump-derailed-msnbcs-centrist-makeover#.3
UPf3F7Fw (noting that MSNBC found “success as a progressive voice during the George W.
Bush administration.”).
43. See Douglas B. Hindman, Knowledge Gaps, Belief Gaps, and Public Opinion about
Health Care Reform, 89 JOURNALISM & MASS COMM. Q. 585, 598–99 (2012) (finding that a
pre-existing “belief gap” between partisans about health care reform increased the longer the
bill was before Congress, as did a “knowledge gap” about what was actually in the bill, providing evidence of differential influence of separate media outlets).
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ed, since these outlets remain the primary source of news coverage
for only a small fraction of the American public.44
In short, there are a whole range of interlocking factors that contribute to our factionalized politics, and the deepening hostility that
has accompanied it. It should surprise no one that polarized America
is reflected in Congress. It is thus a less-than-persuasive critique to
argue that gerrymandering plays only a limited role in polarization,
because all factors play a limited role. Our challenge is not to identify
the non-existent, single smoking gun. It is instead to understand that
polarization is preventing our political institutions from functioning
and to identify solutions, all of which will necessarily be partial, that
can help reduce the polarization and allow those institutions to work
more effectively in formulating responses to public policy challenges.
Seen through this lens, the role of gerrymandering comes more
clearly into focus—as does the value of ending it. While partisan redistricting did not cause polarization, it has played a role in worsening the situation, bringing its effects from the political discourse into
the House, and creating congressional districts that either compel or
incentivize members of Congress to take the most extreme stands and
work in the most adversarial way. In other words, gerrymandering
has made things worse—and getting rid of it can improve
the situation.

B. Non-partisan Districting Will Reduce Polarization in the House
The Pennsylvania congressional delegation is a prime example of
the problem we face, and amply demonstrates why moving to nonpartisan districting will improve the situation. After redistricting that
took place following the 2010 Census, Pennsylvania’s districts were
drawn to favor the Republican Party, which had taken control of the
state government in the GOP’s sweeping victory in the 2010 elections.45 One result of their redistricting efforts was a delegation that
44. See, e.g., Lexington, Why Fox News Is Less to Blame For Polarised Politics Than
You Think, ECONOMIST (Mar. 26, 2013), http://www.economist.com/blogs/lexington/2013
/03/media-and-political-polarisation (“Fox News, the highest-rated cable news channel, has an
average primetime audience of about 2m, or about 0.7% of the population.”). While the average primetime audience may understate the audience during “peak” political seasons, such as
just before an election, the truth remains that the cable news channels do not attract a large
enough pool of viewers to “explain the growing ferocity of American democracy[.]” Id.
45. Early in 2018, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down the districts the state
legislature had drawn, finding them to have been a partisan gerrymander in violation of the
Pennsylvania Constitution. League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737 (Pa.

239

MARCOSSON, FOR PUBLICIATION, 4.27.19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BYU Journal of Public Law

5/20/2019 5:28 PM

[Vol. 33

favored Republicans thirteen to five after the 2012 elections, even
though Democratic congressional candidates actually earned more
votes in Pennsylvania than their Republican opponents in 2012.46
But the main point I want to make is not about the partisan
split itself. I am concerned about the resulting, and deep, ideological
divide that follows when districts are gerrymandered in this fashion.
Look at the results in the five Democratically-held districts
in Pennsylvania:
1st District
Robert Brady* (Dem) 85.0% (225,985)
John Featherman(GOP) 15.0% (39,736)
2nd District
Chaka Fattah*(Dem) 89.4% (301,869)
Robert Mansfield(GOP) 9.4% (31,648)
Jim Foster(Ind) 1.3% (4,243)
13th District
Allyson Schwartz*(Dem) 68.9% (204,686)
Joe Rooney(GOP) 31.1% (92,308)
14th District
Mike Doyle*(Dem) 76.9% (249,012)
Hans Lessmann(GOP) 23.1% (74,955)

2018). Trying to deal with the problem of partisan gerrymandering through litigation has been
tried—and to this point, failed—in the federal courts. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267
(2004) (four-Justice plurality holds that partisan gerrymandering is a non-justiciable political
question for lack of judicially manageable standards to decide cases; Justice Kennedy concurs
and says that no standard was presented in Vieth, but it is possible one could be developed).
Fourteen years after Vieth, the Supreme Court considered yet another attempt by plaintiffs to
come up with a “judicially manageable standard” sufficient to render the question justiciable but
the Court evaded by the question by holding that the plaintiffs had not established their standing, remanding the case for consideration of that issue. See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S.Ct. 1916
(2018).
46. Democratic candidates earned 2,722,490 votes across Pennsylvania’s eighteen districts in 2012, an average of 151,249 votes per district. Their Republican opponents earned
2,651,901 votes, an average of 147,327 votes per district. See 2012 Pennsylvania House Results,
POLITICO (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.politico.com/2012-election/results/house/pennsylvania
/ (giving election results in each district). Given neutral districting, the expected result of this
nearly-even split of the state electorate would have been a 10-8 or a 9-9 split of the delegation,
rather than a lopsided 13-5 outcome in either party’s favor.
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17th District
Matthew Cartwright(Dem) 60.5% (157,629)
Laureen Cummings(GOP) 39.5% (102,754)
* - Incumbent
Each of these Democrats, mostly incumbents, won his or her seat
with over 60% of the vote. All but newcomer Matt Cartwright won
with more than twice as many votes as the Republican in the race. If
any of them were to face a genuine threat in these districts, it would
come from a primary within the Democratic Party rather than a Republican challenger in the general election. Second only to the need
to raise money for the next campaign, the most important priority for
any of these Pennsylvania Democrats is to stay true to the party’s
ideological and political agenda. These representatives have little or
no incentive to cater to the few Republicans, and ideological conservatives, among their constituents by shifting or moderating their
positions on issues that might be particularly important to such voters. The only result they might see from working or compromising
with Republicans would be to increase the chance of a primary challenge—the one time in the electoral process in these districts when a
Democratic incumbent could be vulnerable to a well-funded challenger basing a campaign on the premise that they had not been sufficiently in tune to the strong Democratic leanings of the district.
At least one of the Pennsylvania winners in 2012 would hardly
need to be taught the lesson that being a moderate can lead to political peril. Rep. Matt Cartwright won a contested Democratic primary
in which he ousted ten-term incumbent Tim Holden, whom he portrayed as too conservative for the strongly Democratic district.47 And
in fact, Cartwright had a point; Holden was one of the most conservative Democrats in the House.48 He was strongly pro-life, at
47. See Scott Bland, Cartwright Defeats Holden in Pa. 17th District Democratic Primary, NAT’L J. (Apr. 24, 2012), https://www.nationaljournal.com/s/126968/cartwright-defeatsholden-pa-17th-district-democratic-primary? (“Holden, a battle-seasoned veteran first elected
in 1992, had been repeatedly targeted by Republicans over the years, but his independent, Blue
Dog Democratic credentials consistently swayed electorates to his side. This year, though, he
was caught from the left by Cartwright, who argued that Holden was too conservative to represent the new, more liberal-leaning 17th District.”).
48. See Sponsorship Analysis of Rep. Tim Holden, GOVTRACK, http://www.govtrack.us
/congress/members/tim_holden/400183 (last visited Mar. 22, 2019) (showing Rep. Holden’s
“ideology score” as being almost perfectly in the center of the whole House—one of the most
conservative Democrats but to the left of every Republican).
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times earning a 0% rating from the National Abortion Rights Action
League and a 100% rating from the National Right to Life Committee.49 He had (at best) a mixed record on LGBT rights, having voted
for constitutional amendments to ban same-sex marriage and for a
ban on adoptions by gay men and lesbians in Washington, D.C.50 On
the other hand, Holden supported President Obama’s stimulus program, and had a strongly pro-labor voting record.51
I could go on listing Representative Holden’s lack of orthodoxy,
but the point is that he was a loyal Democrat on many bread-andbutter issues, while far from the party’s mainstream on other issues of
great importance to many of the party faithful. The Pennsylvania
17th District, which the GOP-controlled Pennsylvania Legislature
had made more Democratic in redistricting so that other districts
could be left with stronger Republican majorities, was attuned to the
issues on which challenger Cartwright could emphasize incumbent
Holden’s most conservative positions. Holden was not just vulnerable; he was doomed.
Once he took office, Cartwright’s positions differed noticeably
from those taken by Holden. He applauded52 the Supreme Court’s
decisions striking down the Defense of Marriage Act53 and clearing
the way for same-sex marriage in California.54 In June 2013, he also
49. See Tim Holden on Abortion, ONTHEISSUES, http://www.ontheissues.org/PA
/Tim_Holden.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2019) (setting forth in summary fashion Rep. Holden’s
votes, positions, and ratings from interest groups on key issues).
50. See Tim Holden on Civil Rights, ONTHEISSUES, http://www.ontheissues.org/PA
/Tim_Holden.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2019) (listing votes for constitutional amendments to
bar same-sex marriage in 2004 and 2006, and for the D.C. adoption bill in 1999). In 2007, however, Holden did support the Employment Nondiscrimination Act (ENDA), to bar job discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. Id.
51. See Tim Holden on Corporations, ONTHEISSUES, http://www.ontheissues.org/PA/
Tim_Holden.htm (last visited Mar. 22, 2019) (noting Holden’s vote for $825 billion economic
recovery package in January 2009, as well as his 100% rating from the United Food and Commercial Workers International Union and other pro-labor votes).
52. See Matthew Cartwright, Cartwright Applauds SCOTUS Ruling Paving the Way
Towards “Equality for All,” VOTE SMART (June 26, 2013), http://votesmart.org/publicstatement/796677/cartwright-applauds-scotus-ruling-paving-the-way-towards-equality-forall#.UdiiEPm1GrY (“I applaud both rulings made by the Supreme Court this morning. The
Defense of Marriage Act treated loving, committed gay and lesbian couples as a separate and
lesser class of people. The Supreme Court has righted that wrong, and our country is better off
for it.”).
53. See United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013) (Section 3 of the Defense of
Marriage Act is unconstitutional as intrusion into state authority over marriage and in failing to
accord equal dignity to same-sex couples’ relationships).
54. See Hollingsworth v. Perry, 570 U.S. 693 (2013) (proponents of state ballot initiative
banning recognition of same-sex marriage lack particularized injury and thus standing to appeal
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voted against a high-profile abortion-related bill, the “Pain Capable
Unborn Child Protection Act,”55 which passed the House almost entirely along party-lines56—a bill which certainly would have had Rep.
Holden’s support were he still in the House. Rep. Cartwright is fitting comfortably into the norm of the House Democratic caucus (only six Democrats supported the abortion bill, for example), and making it almost unimaginable that he would be challenged in a primary
the way he challenged Holden in 2012.57 Given the partisan make-up
of the district, Cartwright is highly unlikely to be unseated unless he
is challenged from the left, since he has already survived what is typically a new member’s most vulnerable race—his or her first run
for re-election.
Thus, one important upshot of the districting in Pennsylvania
(which was done principally to give a huge partisan edge to Republicans) was to move the Democratic caucus in the state to the left, and
thus increase partisan polarization in the House. Even if having more
progressive Democrats in Congress happens to be a “good” result
from an individual’s perspective, that outcome should not be a side
effect of artificial manipulation of district lines for partisan advantage.
It should result from liberals convincing voters to elect candidates
like Cartwright, and the progressive positions they support, in competitive districts. In other words, the political framework within

adverse district court judgment striking down the initiative).
55. See H.R. 1797, 113th Cong. (1st Sess. 2013) (showing passage of bill by House on
June 18, 2013, and referral to Senate Judiciary Committee on June 19, along with summary of
provisions).
56. See Linda Feldmann, House GOP Passes Major Antiabortion Bill. Why Democrats
Are Pleased, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 18, 2013), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/
DC-Decoder/2013/0618/House-GOP-passes-major-antiabortion-bill.-Why-Democrats-arepleased.-video (“The Republican-controlled House of Representatives on Tuesday passed the
most significant legislation in 10 years: the Pain-Capable Unborn Child Protection Act, which
would ban abortions after 20 weeks of pregnancy. The bill, which passed 228 to 196 on a mostly party-line vote, goes directly against the holding of Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court ruling
that legalized abortion nationwide.”).
57. In 2014, Cartwright was in fact not challenged in a primary, and coasted to reelection. See Pennsylvania’s 17th Congressional District Elections, 2014, BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/Pennsylvania’s_17th_Congressional_District_elections,_2014 (last visited
Mar. 22, 2019). His reelection campaign was closer in 2016, almost certainly due to the more
general Republican success in the state during the Trump-Clinton election, but he did win 5446%. See Pennsylvania’s 17th Congressional District Elections, 2016, BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org/Pennsylvania%27s_17th_Congressional_District_election,_2016
(last
visited Mar. 22, 2019).
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which the parties and candidates operate should make winning
political arguments and debates the only genuine, reliable path to political triumph.
To put the point another way: would any progressive really believe the Pennsylvania trade-off is worth it? Pennsylvania created a
district that was solidly blue enough to send Rep. Holden packing,
and elect a more liberal House member like Matthew Cartwright,
while making the rest of the Democrats in the delegation safer because of the similarly-large majorities in their districts. In return,
Democrats paid the price of a thirteen to five Republican advantage
in the Pennsylvania House delegation, even after a 2012 election in
which Democrats received more votes for Congress statewide. The
GOP-held state legislature packed so many Democratic voters into
those five districts that they were almost certain to be won by strong
liberal Democrats. But instead of splitting the eighteen seats nine to
nine in a state where that is how the votes split (Democrats won
slightly more votes, but the parties fought something very close to a
fifty to fifty draw), Democrats lost a net of four seats in a closelydivided House.
The difference made by drawing compact, non-partisan districts
can be seen by looking at the change in the balance of the districts
that resulted from the Pennsylvania Supreme Court’s decision to
strike down the old lines and draw new ones itself in early 2018.58 I
have already discussed the strong partisan divisions that characterized
the districts the Pennsylvania Legislature drew in 2010; there is an
important contrast to the Supreme Court’s new districts. Nate Cohn,
Matthew Bloch, and Kevin Quealy drew revealing side-by-side comparisons of the districts:59
2010 Map/2018 Map
District One: Clinton +61/Clinton +48
District Two: Clinton +83/Clinton +84
District Three: Trump +26/Trump +20
District Four: Trump +21/Trump +9
District Five: Trump +29/Trump +43

58. See supra note 45 and accompanying text discussing decision in League of Women
Voters v. Commonwealth.
59. Nate Cohn, Matthew Bloch & Kevin Quealy, The New Pennsylvania Congressional
Map, District by District, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2018/02/19/upshot/pennsylvania-new-house-districts-gerrymandering.html.
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District Six: Clinton +1/Clinton +9
District Seven: Clinton +2/Clinton +28
District Eight: Clinton +2/Clinton +2
District Nine: Trump +43/Trump +46
District Ten: Trump +36/Trump +36
District Eleven: Trump +24/Trump +34
District Twelve: Trump +21/Trump +3
District Thirteen: Clinton +34/Clinton +19
District Fourteen: Clinton +35/Clinton +27
District Fifteen: Trump+8/Clinton +1
District Sixteen: Trump +7/Trump +26
District Seventeen: Trump +10/Trump +10
District Eighteen: Trump +20/Trump +29
In both instances, there are six districts that can reasonably be
characterized as competitive (neither side had a partisan advantage of
more than ten points in the 2016 presidential election).60 But the new
lines produce a partisan division that more closely resembles the state
as a whole (instead of having a twelve to six division between Trump
and Clinton-leaning districts, the new map has a ten to eight divide),
and more important, has a lower median gap (reduced from +14 Republican to +3).61 It is important not to overstate the impact of ending a partisan gerrymander like the one that had created the 2010
lines in Pennsylvania—the new lines have no more truly competitive
districts (if we count a district as competitive if it has a partisan divide
of 10% or less) than existed before; there were six such districts using
both the 2010 and the 2018 lines. In this respect, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court could have done an even better job of creating districts that would encourage moderates to run, and (as important) encourage all candidates to take more moderate positions than they
would in partisan districts, since the winning margin is likely to be
found in those decisive voters who are not part of either side’s base.
Creating such districts should be a key priority of non-partisan districting commissions, alongside respecting and reflecting the partisan
balance of the state’s electorate to the greatest extent possible.
The basic story of the gerrymandering problem can be told, from
either side of the partisan aisle, nationwide. In states where Demo60. In 2010, those are Districts Six, Seven, Eight, Fifteen, Sixteen, and Seventeen. Under the 2018 map, they are Districts Four, Six, Eight, Twelve, Fifteen, and Seventeen.
61. See Cohn, Bloch & Quealy, supra note 59.
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crats hold sway, they can and do draw the lines so that Republicans
can elect highly partisan, deep-red Republicans, but in a relatively
small number of districts compared to their percentage of the
statewide vote. It just so happens that, because of the outcome of the
2010 elections in which Republicans did particularly well, the GOP
was able to do this in more states in the most recent cycle of postCensus redistricting. But what goes around can come around, and for
our political system as a whole, it does not matter which party can
take advantage of the situation at any particular time, whether it be
immediately after a Census (when redistricting is mandatory)62, or
mid-decade (when state legislatures have sometimes decided to take it
up when partisan advantage is there to be gained)63 The result is to
add to the polarization and partisanship that locks us into a vicious
cycle of gridlock, for which each side blames the other, which leads
to greater polarization, and then even more gridlock.
Consider the world that confronted a Republican member of the
House when the immigration reform bill came before Congress in
2013. Let us assume that his or her district is 65% Republican and
voted overwhelmingly for every Republican presidential nominee
since John McCain in 2008. In this scenario the political truth is that
supporting the bill that passed the Senate64 (or signaling a willingness
to do so on terms that would put a deal with Democrats within reach)
would make it more likely he or she would face a serious primary
challenge, whereas opposing the bill would carry very little political
risk. This is particularly true in the post-Trump world, in which the
GOP center shifted sharply on the immigration issue in particular, in
a way that makes supporting an immigration compromise all the
more risky for a typical Republican House member. A Democratic
challenger in the general election would surely criticize the no vote,
62. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned
among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers . . . The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first
Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten
Years . . . .”).
63. See Charlie Cook, The Cook Report - Mid-Decade Redistricting Growing More
Popular, NAT’L J. (Feb. 26, 2005, 7:00 AM), https://www.nationaljournal.com/s/420658/cookreport-mid-decade-redistricting-growing-more-popular? (noting that mid-decade redistricting
began with move by GOP-held Texas legislature in 2003, prior to which it was “unheard-of in
modern-day American politics, except under court order,” but that Texas’ move quickly spurred
proposals in California, Illinois, Georgia, and New Mexico in the ‘00s).
64. See Seung Min Kim, Senate Passes Immigration Bill, POLITICO (June 28, 2013, 4:25
AM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/06/immigration-bill-2013-senate-passes-93530.html
(discussing bipartisan vote and compromises over provisions of the bill that passed the Senate).
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but with only 35% Democratic voters in the district, that attack is
likely to do very little damage to this incumbent’s position.65
No matter what happened on immigration in 2013, it should be
emphasized that no single vote, and no one position on an issue, will
decide the fate of each party’s House incumbents. While so many of
today’s districts are highly polarized, that does not mean their voters
look at only one issue. For this reason, opposing an immigration bill
will not assure Democrats a primary challenger, and supporting it
will not make certain that Republicans will get one. But each departure from the party line—whether it be on abortion, gun control,
immigration, health care, raising the debt ceiling, or others—creates
opportunities for the next Matt Carpenter to seize upon. In the case
of Rep. Brad Wenstrup, who ousted Rep. Jean Schmidt in a GOP
primary in Ohio’s heavily-Republican Second District in 2012, the
issues were her votes to raise the debt ceiling, in favor of the Wall
Street rescue package in 2008 . . . and a picture of her kissing President Obama as he entered the House chamber to deliver a State of
the Union Address, all of which were used heavily against her by
Wenstrup in the campaign.66 These issues—if we can call greeting
the President of the United States an issue—might have been troublesome to a Republican incumbent in any district, but they were almost certain to open the door to a successful challenge in Ohio’s
Second District, one of the most solidly Republican in Ohio.67
A similarly dramatic story unfolded in 2016 in North Carolina’s
Second District, where former Tea Party favorite Representative
Renee Ellmers was ousted in a bruising Republican primary in which

65. Of course, a 65-35% partisan split in this hypothetical ignores independents, who
almost certainly would make up a quarter or more of the voters. The numbers in the text are
meant simply to illustrate the way in which creating districts with a heavy partisan split in one
direction or the other tends to affect the ability and willingness of House members to reach
across the aisle to achieve compromise and pass legislation. If the numbers in the district were
50% Republican, 25% Democratic, and 25% independent, the point would remain the same.
66. See John Gizzi, Rep. Jean Schmidt: Why the Four-Term Ohio Congresswoman
Lost, HUM. EVENTS (Mar. 11, 2012), http://www.humanevents.com/2012/03/11/rep-jeanschmidt-why-the-fourterm-ohio-congresswoman-lost/ (discussing votes and images that were
harmful to Schmidt among Republican primary voters).
67. One indication of how safe Ohio’s Second District is for Republicans is that despite
running without the advantages of incumbency, Wenstrup managed to run up the fourthhighest margin of victory of the twelve Republicans who won Ohio congressional seats in 2012;
the three who ran ahead of him in other districts were all incumbents, and several other incumbents did not manage to win with margins approaching Wenstrup’s 59% of the vote. See 2012
Ohio House Results, POLITICO (Nov. 19, 2012), http://www.politico.com/2012-election/
results/house/ohio/ (giving election results in each district).
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her opponents ran to her right, highlighting votes she had cast on
such issues as abortion, the debt ceiling, and the Export-Import
Bank—all of which became hot-button issues with grass-roots conservatives.68 The message of Ellmers’ defeat to any incumbent—
Democrat or Republican—is that straying from party-line positions
in a district hard-wired to be filled with the party faithful is a perfect
way to end your time in Congress.
It also works the other way. That is, there is evidence that members of the House who do not represent highly polarized, extreme
districts can contribute to moderation and compromise. Interestingly,
in the spring of 2018, a select group of approximately twenty-five
Republican House members tried to force Speaker Paul Ryan to allow a vote on a compromise immigration bill via use of the discharge
petition.69 Although they represented a fraction of the GOP caucus,
their signatures could—if every one of the 191 Democrats signed the
petition—get the petition right up to the 218 threshold to force a
vote. Critically, these Republicans represented districts atypical for
the contemporary GOP, with heavy representation of minority voters. These Republican members fear that failure or refusal to compromise on the issue could be fatal, or at least hazardous, to their
reelection chances. Members of the House who are motivated to
compromise is precisely what our political system needs more of:
members who come from swing districts, perceiving their interests to
lie in reaching across the aisle.
Obviously, we need more than anecdotal examples of the effect of
both strongly partisan districts adding to the polarization in Congress, and closely-drawn districts reducing it. While it is difficult to
68. See Simone Pathé, The Rise and (Probable) Fall of Renee Ellmers, ROLL CALL
(Mar. 21, 2016, 7:13 PM), http://www.rollcall.com/news/politics/renee-ellmers-primary-fightlife (discussing uphill primary fight Rep. Ellmers was waging against fellow incumbent George
Holding, because their districts had been merged in court-ordered redistricting, and her votes
had made her vulnerable); Elena Schneider, Renee Ellmers Is First GOP Incumbent Knocked
Off in Primary, POLITICO (June 7, 2016, 8:43 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2016/06/
holding-defeats-ellmers-in-member-versus-member-primary-224032.
69. See Don Wolfensberger, Immigration Discharge Petition Approaches Final Showdown, HILL (June 4, 2018, 10:15 AM), http://thehill.com/blogs/congress-blog/politics/390503immigration-discharge-petition-approaches-final-showdown (discussing effort by moderate
Republicans to reach the 218 signatory threshold to compel House leadership to permit a vote
on a number of immigration proposals). Under House Rule XV(c), a discharge petition can remove any bill from committee after the bill has been in committee for thirty days, if the discharge petition is signed by a majority of the members of the House. See RULES OF THE
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES XV, clause 2, 115th Cong. (2016), https://www.govinfo.
gov/content/pkg/HMAN-115/pdf/HMAN-115.pdf.
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quantify the impact of redistricting on polarization in the House of
Representatives, evidence is strong that there is a relationship. A
study by Professor Corbett Grainger of voting patterns among the
members of the California state legislature from the 1960s to the
2000s shows that during periods when districts were drawn by the
state’s politicians (i.e., by the state legislature and governor), the districts were both less competitive, and the representatives elected
tended to take more extreme positions.70 Professor Grainger’s study
of the relationship between districting methods and voting patterns
in California was particularly intriguing because the State shifted
back and forth between drawing district lines through its political
system and via non-partisan means,71 and as they shifted, the voting
patterns of the State’s legislators shifted along with them, moderating
when the lines had been drawn by court-appointed special masters or
non-partisan commissions and becoming more extreme when the
lines were drawn by the State’s politicians. Democrats tended to
move to the left,72 while Republicans moved to the right,73 when representing districts that were politically drawn.
Not surprisingly, the same study shows that politically-drawn districts in California have been substantially less competitive than those
drawn non-politically.74 As Professor Grainger puts it:

70. See Corbett A. Grainger, Redistricting and Polarization: Who Draws the Lines in
California?, 53 J. L. & ECON. 545 (2010).
71. As Grainger notes, the non-partisan line-drawing in California during the periods we
studied occurred because the state was “forced” into it when its politicians could not agree on a
redistricting plan, throwing the process into the courts which then imposed a plan on the state.
See id. at 548–49 (describing impasses after 1970 and 1990 Censuses). More recently, California has adopted a system of districting by non-partisan commission, bypassing the state legislature and governor entirely.
72. Id. at 554 (“Democrats’ scores . . . reveal a trend in which they became more liberal
in legislatively drawn districts and more moderate in panel-drawn districts. Specifically, being in
a panel-drawn district in the 1970s is associated with a decrease of more than 11 points in the
average Democrat’s CFL score. When districts were legislatively drawn in the 1980s, the average Democrat’s score became more liberal by nearly 14 points. In the 1990s, average scores
again decreased slightly by approximately 3 points. The CLCV scores for Democrats show
a similar pattern, increasing significantly after redistricting in the 1980s and decreasing again
by approximately 17 points after redistricting in the 1990s.”).
73. Id. at 554 Table 2 (showing that Republican legislators’ votes became sharply more
conservative in the 1980s, when districts had been drawn politically, that the trend towards polarization by GOP members of Congress reduced significantly in the 1990s when districts were
drawn by courts, and then accelerated again after partisan districting after the 2000 Census).
74. Id. at 555–57 (discussing various measures showing that California legislative races
were substantially closer in years when districts had been drawn in non-political ways).
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[C]ritical to the polarization hypothesis is the argument that
legislatively drawn districts are less competitive (relative to paneldrawn districts), which allows legislators to take more extreme positions in their roll call votes . . . [T]here is evidence that the margins of victory in legislatively drawn districts have been much larger
than . . . those in panel-drawn districts in the California state legislature. [This] pattern . . . suggests that elections under panel-drawn
districts are more competitive, on average, for members of
both parties.75

Legislators like to be re-elected. When they represent highly partisan
districts, they take highly partisan positions. When they represent
competitive districts, they tend to take positions that allow them to
appeal to more of the swing voters, who often determine the outcome
of the elections in these districts.76 Or at the very least, they must be
attentive to the concerns of the voters who actually comprise their
district—that is, voters whose views stretch across the ideological
spectrum, instead of being highly concentrated on the right or left—
and show a willingness to engage in a dialog with constituents on issues of disagreement. In and of itself, this represents the very engagement that can be an antidote to extreme polarization.
Some scholars have criticized the idea that there is a relationship
between partisan districting and legislative polarization by creating a
wildly exaggerated version of the claimed relationship, and then debunking it. Take this passage from a 2009 article by Professors
McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal:
Consequently only conservative Republicans can win in conservative Republican districts just as liberal Democrats dominate liberal
Democratic districts. Because redistricting no longer produces
moderate, bipartisan, or heterogeneous districts, moderates cannot
win election to the House.
This narrative is attractive not only because of analytical elegance,
but also because it suggests a single, perhaps even feasible, solution
to what ails the American polity: take the politics out of redistricting. Districts drawn by neutral experts and judges would be heterogeneous and politically moderate. Appealing to independents would

75. Id. at 555.
76. Id. at 559 (“[A]s seats become safer, Republicans take more conservative positions
and Democrats take more liberal voting positions. Similarly, as districts become more competitive (again in terms of voter registration), legislators tend to take more moderate positions. This
finding . . . suggests that panel-drawn districts (relative to legislatively drawn districts) are more
competitive and lead to more moderate voting behavior by members of both parties.”).
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become the key to winning election, and polarization would become
a thing of the past.77

If anyone believes anything of the sort—that gerrymandering is the
sole (or even the principal) cause of polarization, or that its elimination would make polarization “a thing of the past”—they have been
remarkably quiet about it. Instead, the real issues are whether partisan districting contributes to polarization (even if it has been mainly a
product of the growth of our polarized politics, rather than a root
cause), and whether eliminating it would reduce polarization. There
are, to my knowledge, no Pollyannas participating in this debate.
Indeed, even McCarty and his colleagues agree with the premise
that gerrymandering contributes to polarization.78 They also
acknowledge that the evidence is mixed on whether there is a correlation between extremely homogenous districts and more extreme and
polarized voting records on the part of the members of Congress who
represent them.79 But they then proceed from finding the evidence
mixed, and inconclusive, to the unjustified conclusion that doing
something to reduce polarization is not among the “reasons to do
something about gerrymandering.”80
A more nuanced view recognizes that if gerrymandering contributes to polarization, then eliminating it can play a part in dealing with
polarization. Mann and Ornstein have it about right:
[R]edistricting makes a difficult situation considerably worse. Lawmakers have become more insular and more attentive to their ideological bases as their districts have become more partisan and homogeneous. Districts have become more like echo chambers,
reinforcing members’ ideological predispositions with fewer dissenting voices back home or fewer disparate groups of constituents
to consider in representation. The impact shows in their behavior;
and reform of the way in which legislative boundaries are redrawn
would make a difference.81

77. Nolan McCarty, Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, Does Gerrymandering Cause
Polarization, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 666, 666 (2009).
78. Id. at 667 (arguing that the gerrymandering effects may constitute 10-15% of the
increase in polarization since the 1970s).
79. Id. at 668 (setting forth evidence on both sides of the correlation question).
80. Id. at 679.
81. THOMAS E. MANN & NORMAN J. ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH: HOW
CONGRESS IS FAILING AMERICA AND HOW TO GET IT BACK ON TRACK 230 (2006) [hereinafter MANN & ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH] (discussing the “unique role of the Senate,
which was designed by the framers to slow the process and add to its deliberative nature”); see
also MANN & ORNSTEIN, WORSE THAN IT LOOKS, supra note 32, at 144–45 (arguing that
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The disappearance of a genuine moderate presence in Congress has
been part of the problem, and steps that have the potential to bring at
least some moderate voices back, from both parties, would be a step
back from the brink of a crisis in our ability to govern ourselves. On a
national basis, even forty to fifty districts drawn with a different partisan mix—with somewhere closer to a 50/50 split, rather than 60% or
more of the district reliably voting one way or the other—would
change the character of the House by restoring ideological overlap
and a core moderate caucus.
This is not to say that we should want a House that is filled with
moderates, or in which the parties overlap to such a degree that they
are indistinguishable. The political climate in contemporary America
is, after all, characterized by bold and extreme differences between
the parties, and between adherents of the left and right. Congress
should reflect that condition of our political life. And, fortunately, no
one believes that anything we could or would do when it comes to
redistricting would eliminate the bomb-throwers of the left and the
right from the House. These Members represent the legitimate passion in our system that comes from the Tea Party on the right and
the Kossacks on the left. But Congress should reflect the fact that
America also has its share of political moderates as well.
There is another simple reason why we should address polarization by ending political redistricting. There are really few, if any,
other steps we can take to respond to polarization. Think about the
various factors that have contributed to our polarized political climate. The realignment of the parties along rigid ideological lines is
not likely to reverse itself.82 And if we are stuck with realignment,

“gerrymandering accounts for at most a modest share of the recent polarization,” and that reform “is no panacea for the ideological polarization of the two parties’ constituencies.”).
82. See Carroll Doherty, 7 Things to Know About Polarization in America, PEW RES.
CTR. (June 12, 2014), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/06/12/7-things-to-knowabout-polarization-in-america/ (“Republicans and Democrats are further apart ideologically
than at any point in recent history, . . . [and] [g]rowing numbers of Republicans and Democrats
express highly negative views of the opposing party.”). The study discussed in the Doherty
piece gives no reason for optimism that partisan polarization will change any time soon. Americans take a dim view of those whose politics and party identification differ from their own. Id.
(“The share of Republicans who have very unfavorable opinions of the Democratic Party has
jumped from 17% to 43% in the last 20 years. Similarly, the share of Democrats with very negative opinions of the Republican Party also has more than doubled, from 16% to 38%.”). And
they have little interest in meaningful compromise. Id. (“To those on the ideological right and
left, compromise now means that their side gets more of what it wants. About six-in-ten acrossthe-board liberals (62%) say the optimal deal between President Barack Obama and the GOP
should be closer to what Obama wants. About as many consistent conservatives (57%) say an
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then we are also stuck with the strong incentive that realignment has
created for the parties to deploy their vast machinery of consultants
and political action committees to engage in a near-permanent campaign of attacks to demonize their political opponents. This source of
polarization is not going away. Even if we wanted to, there is not
much we can do to silence or change the tone of ideologically driven
cable news stations and internet sites. It is difficult to see what reforms would effectively eliminate the presence and salience of hotbutton wedge issues, or how we could deal with the existence of
interest groups organized around them who have numerous incentives to make the politics surrounding those issues as incendiary
as possible.83
In short, there is not much we can do to reduce the harmful effects of polarized politics in a highly polarized nation. Even if gerrymandering is only a partial cause of the problem, non-partisan redistricting will nevertheless moderate the extent to which polarization is
felt in the House of Representatives, and it will improve the chances
for legislative compromise to take place across ideological and partisan lines. It is a step worth taking as one of the few things we can actually do to constructively deal with the problem.

C. The Constitutional Solution: Mandatory Non-partisan
Redistricting
Assuming we even wish to reduce the effects of polarization in
the House of Representatives, ending partisan gerrymandering is our
only real hope.84 The way to do this is to require states to follow the
agreement should be more on the GOP’s terms.”).
83. It is hardly a coincidence that the most divisive issues in our politics are also the ones
in which we can easily identify high-profile interest groups, many of which are famous for their
polarizing approach to their issue, whether it be in how they campaign against politicians they
perceive to be adverse (or insufficiently supportive) on their core issue, or in how they lobby.
The National Rifle Association, for example, utilizes the strongest possible rhetoric to characterize the actions, plans, and motivations of supporters of gun control. See, e.g., Christina
Wilkie, NRA Fundraising Email Steps up Anti-Obama Rhetoric, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 17,
2013, 8:27 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/01/17/nra-fundraising-email_n_2499
853.html (quoting letter written by NRA chief lobbyist Chris Cox, that “Obama and ‘anti-gun
politicians are on an all-out crusade’ to ‘ban your guns and abolish every last sacred right you
have under the Second Amendment . . . until they reduce your freedom to ashes.’”).
84. I say it is the “only real hope” fully aware, of course, of the almost three decades of
the Supreme Court’s tortured attempts to decide whether partisan gerrymanders violate the
Constitution, without thus far even being able to decide whether the cases are justiciable. See
Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (holding that the Court could not discern the politically manageable standards for what constitutes a political gerrymander, and upholding the consti-
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model, adopted by a number of states, pursuant to which bipartisan
or non-partisan commissions supplant state legislatures in conducting
districting. Accomplishing this goal would require something like this
proposed 28th Amendment to the Constitution:
It being the obligation of the several States to apportion their seats
in the House of Representatives, and in light of the harmful lack of
uniformity in the methods and standards by which that responsibility is undertaken, each State shall adopt a method for apportioning
its seats which complies with the requirements of this provision.
Section 1: The State shall create a Commission designed to be either non-partisan or bi-partisan in its membership, and whose
mandate shall be to create U.S. congressional districts that are
compact, contiguous, as nearly equal in population as possible in
conformity with the “one person, one vote” principle, and which
have neither the purpose or substantial effect of favoring any political party or partisan group.
Section 2: Neither the Governor of a State, nor the State Legislature, shall have authority to alter, approve, or disapprove of the district lines established by the Commission.
Section 3: Whether a State has established a method for selecting
members of its redistricting Commission which conforms to the requirements of Section 1 of this provision, and the lawfulness of the
districts adopted by a State Commission, shall be justiciable questions under Article III of this Constitution.85

Currently, only nine states give commissions the primary responsibility for drawing their congressional districts. 86 The proposed 28th
tutionality of the lines drawn in Indiana after the 1980 census, but refusing to hold that such
judicially manageable standards could not be developed in a future case); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541
U.S. 267 (2004) (rejecting challenge to the map drawn in Pennsylvania after the 2000 census,
but no majority opinion left the fractured Court unable to decide whether political gerrymandering is a justiciable claim); Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (remanding partisan gerrymandering challenge to address issue of the plaintiffs’ standing). Interestingly, Justice Stephen Breyer, writing in 2010, ascribed such importance to this issue that Vieth was on the list
as one of the cases that he would name if he “were . . . to have three wishes to turn dissents into
majority opinions . . . .” STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S
VIEW 161 (2010).
85. Section 3’s language providing that compliance with the prior sections of the
Amendment is a justiciable question, including whether the lines that have been drawn have
“the purpose or substantial effect of favoring any political party or partisan group,” would put
an end once and for all to the Supreme Court’s wrangling with this issue in the Vieth line of
cases.
86. See Redistricting Commissions: Congressional Plans, NAT’L CONF. OF ST.
LEGISLATURES (Jan. 21, 2019), http://www.ncsl.org/research/redistricting/redistricting-comm
issions-congressional-plans.aspx.
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Amendment would impose this obligation on the remaining fortyone. All of the nine existing state commissions are designed to be bipartisan in nature,87 and to have at least a partially apolitical membership.88 It is worth noting that significantly more states give districting
commissions primary authority to draw state legislative districts.89
But even fourteen (the number of states with commissions handling
state-level redistricting) would be a fraction of the number necessary
to create enough competitive congressional districts to generate the
reemergence of a moderate caucus that could alter the dynamic in the
House. Since there is no realistic prospect that a sufficient number of
states will voluntarily move to adopt non-partisan districting systems
to make a difference, a constitutional solution mandating that all
states do so is essential.
In an effort to implement this concept, former Attorney General
Eric Holder is spearheading an effort to address the pernicious effects
of gerrymandering.90 While a large part of the Holder campaign is
aimed at enhancing the Democratic Party electoral prospects,91 his
strategy also includes efforts to establish non-partisan redistricting
processes, regardless of which party might benefit in a particular state
from limiting political control of the process.92 There is a clear dis87. Id. (naming the states (Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Michigan,
Montana, New Jersey, and Washington) and describing how each selects its commission’s
members).
88. Id. For example, Hawaii bars any commission member from running for Congress in
any of the two elections following redistricting, while Idaho bars anyone from serving who is an
elected or appointed official at the time they are named to the commission.
89. See Redistricting Commissions: Congressional Plans, supra note 86 (describing the
14 states with commissions having primary authority to draw state legislative districts).
90. See David Daley, Eric Holder’s Battle Against Gerrymandering, NEW YORKER
(Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/eric-holders-battle-againstgerrymandering.
91. Id. (discussing electoral setbacks Democrats suffered during the Obama presidency
and the 2010s, largely as a result of Republican success in controlling redistricting in key swing
states after the 2010 Census). Among the states that have been a central focus has been Wisconsin, where the post-2010 partisan gerrymander was so effective that—when it came to the state
legislature—“in 2012, Democratic assembly candidates earned a hundred and seventy-four
thousand more votes than Republicans, but the G.O.P. won sixty of the ninety-nine seats.” Id.
92. See Alexander Burns, Eric Holder’s Group Targets All-GOP States to Attack Gerrymandering, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/06/us/politics/
democrats-gerrymandering-election-maps.html ([past participle] Holder’s “group is monitoring
a number of state-level ballot initiatives that could put anti-gerrymandering laws up for a vote
this year,” a course which Holder believes may be—where available—“the best way to” attack
partisan gerrymandering); Benjy Sarlin, Eric Holder Leads Democrats to War on Gerrymandering, NBC (Feb. 7, 2018, 14:47 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/elections/ericholder-leads-democrats-war-gerrymandering-n845576 (noting that Holder’s organization is
“preparing to protect [non-partisan] commissions in states like Arizona,” and may support bal-
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tinction between a project aimed at changing the nature of the redistricting process, as opposed to just giving Democrats a greater voice
in what would remain a partisan process in most states. While Holder’s effort is a laudable attempt to reverse the effects of the specific
brand of partisan gerrymandering that occurred after the 2010 Census, it is more important to eliminate such gerrymandering.
Unfortunately, we encounter the very Catch-22 I mentioned at
the outset of this article. It is extraordinarily unlikely that the same
polarized, hyper-partisan House of Representatives, whose members
are creatures of, and whose political survival depends upon, the political climate that swept them into office, will turn around and vote to
fundamentally alter the system that benefits them. For that reason, it
is difficult to see the circumstances under which two-thirds of the
House would vote for anything like the 28th Amendment proposed
above. And even if that happened, ratification would require the assent of three-fourths of the state legislatures, many of which engaged
in the very partisan gerrymandering that is the source of our woes.
We have, in short, reached a crisis in our democratic institutions
whereby the reforms we need depend upon the cooperation of those
who are the very reason we need reform in the first place.
This dilemma is hardly new in our constitutional history. An
analogous problem was at the heart of the Supreme Court’s landmark
decision in Baker v. Carr,93 where the Court held that reapportionment of state legislators constitutes a justiciable political question. It
is no exaggeration to say that in Baker the Court was confronted with
a political system that had completely broken down. The state legislature in Tennessee had refused to redraw its district lines for nearly
fifty years, because rural legislators recognized that reapportionment
would diminish (if not extinguish) their political power.94 The lesson
of the Tennessee Legislature’s obstructionism is that system breakdown, under the right (or wrong) circumstances, can make reforming
the system impossible, absent outside intervention of the type the
Supreme Court provided in Baker. Just as those rural legislators
would not voluntarily redistrict themselves out of power, neither will
the members of the current House.

lot initiatives to create them in states like Michigan).
93. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
94. Stephen Ansolabehere & Samuel Issacharoff, The Story of Baker v. Carr, in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 271, 272 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2009).
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II. LETTING THE LEGISLATURE LEGISLATE: THE TWOCONGRESS SOLUTION TO FILIBUSTER REFORM

The Senate’s role in the legislative process is unquestionably different from that of the House of Representatives. The Senate has
traditionally been the chamber in which proposals receive more
measured, careful consideration—it is not for nothing that the Senate
perceives itself as a genuinely deliberative body.95 But when the tools
and procedures by which it has traditionally assured careful deliberation instead become tools to simply prevent the Senate from operating, in the service of partisan gridlock or the exercise of special interest influence, then the case for reform is easy to make.
What is not as easy, however, is to find a reform that ends the obstruction, but simultaneously leaves a mechanism in place that preserves the Senate’s legitimate function as the body in Congress that
achieves further contemplation of (possibly) rash proposals. Some
bills may gain currency—and quick passage—in the House of Representatives, but may be ill-considered upon further reflection. My
purpose in this section is two-fold: first to make the case that the filibuster has lost its utility as an acceptable vehicle for achieving deliberation in our legislative process, and then to propose a constitutionally-enshrined alternative that will give the Senate an opportunity to
slow down the legislative process without bringing it to a crashing
halt. Like the 28th Amendment proposed in the prior section, the
29th Amendment I will discuss here is much easier said than done.

A. The Accelerating Abuse of the Filibuster: The Rise of the
Individualistic and Partisan Senate
The Senate was already in institutional trouble before the dawn
of the 21st century. The filibuster had once been effective more as a
threat to compel compromise than it had been as an actual legislative
device. But more and more, it was used as a partisan tool instead. Instead of utilizing the background understanding that the filibuster’s
95. See MANN AND ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH, supra note 81, at 162 (discussing the “unique role of the Senate, which was designed by the framers to slow the process and
add to its deliberative nature”); Senator Jeanne Shaheen, Gridlock Rules: Why We Need Filibuster Reform in the U.S. Senate, 50 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 2 (2013) (“The Senate was designed by the Founding Fathers to be the slower, more deliberative body.”).
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very existence could and should produce bargains that would make its
actual use unnecessary, the minority has used it to stop opponents in
the majority from advancing unwelcome legislation, and to signal to
party faithful that filibustering Senators were carrying out the party’s
pure agenda.
In a well-functioning Senate, the fact that the minority has the
filibuster available, if necessary, would lead the majority to respect
reasonable requests for compromise. But at the same time, the minority will limit its demands and use the filibuster threat sparingly.
After all, the members of the minority look forward to the time when
they may soon be in the majority, since 1/3 of the Senate is up for
election every two years.96 At that point, they want to be able to enact
a sizable portion of their agenda without having to sacrifice too much
to filibuster-backed minority demands.
But the increase in the use of the filibuster over the last part of
the 20th century, and since, has taken us outside the realm of a wellfunctioning Senate. This increase has been unmistakable, and welldocumented. The trend began when Mike Mansfield replaced
Lyndon Johnson as the Senate Majority Leader when the former became Vice-President in 1961.97 Prior to Mansfield, filibusters had
shut the Senate down. Because this meant the institution paid a high
price for each episode, they were rarely utilized.98 Mansfield adopted
a different approach, as Mann & Ornstein explain:
Over time, he began to alter the way filibusters were handled,
relying on a “two-track system”: that is, the Senate would let
some of its work go on while relegating the filibustered issue to
a separate stream of debate until cloture could be invoked, whereby

96. See Rebecca Shabad, Will the Senate Ever Kill the Filibuster?, CBS NEWS,
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/will-the-senate-ever-kill-the-filibuster/ (last updated Aug. 8,
2017, 9:42 AM) (noting that in April 2017, sixty-one Senators signed a letter expressing support
for maintaining the legislative filibuster, even after it had been eliminated for judicial nominations, and preserving the “existing rules, practices and traditions” of the Senate). Republican
Senator Roger Wicker of Mississippi made explicit the partisan motivation that Senators have
to preserve the filibuster even when they are in the majority; it will not always be that way. Id.
(“There are going to be times when the Republicans are in the majority, and there are going to
be times when we’re in the minority . . . So I think we should tread very carefully when it deals
with filibuster reform.”) (quoting Senator Wicker).
97. See Mike Mansfield: Quiet Leadership in Troubled Times, U. S. SENATE HIST.
OFF., http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/generic/People_Leaders_
Mansfield.htm. (last visited Mar. 22, 2019).
98. See MANN & ORNSTEIN, THE BROKEN BRANCH, supra note 81, at 81.
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two-thirds of senators could vote to end debate and get a vote,
or fail to get the supermajority and pull the bill from the agenda,
effectively killing it.99

While the Senate paid a far lower price in disruption of its business for each filibuster, the more critical result of this shift was to
empower those who wanted to filibuster by creating a system in
which they could achieve their goals,100 thus making the filibuster a
more useful tool of obstruction. The resulting increase in bills being
killed by filibusters, in turn, created pressure for reform of the filibuster rules to make it easier to invoke cloture and thus break the increasing number of filibusters—which succeeded in 1975, when the
supermajority required to end a filibuster was reduced from twothirds of those present and voting to sixty Senators.101
This, however, was only a temporary palliative. The longer-term
trends that were pulling the Senate apart, and encouraging an
increased use of the filibuster, ultimately proved much stronger, and
even the sixty-vote threshold to break filibusters did not restore
the balance between effectiveness for the majority and recognition of
minority influence that had prevailed in earlier times.102 Instead,
the use of the filibuster continued to increase over the following
twenty-five years.103
During this time, the parties in the Senate had also become more
ideologically polarized. Prior to, and even through, the 1980s,
each party caucus had a relatively wide range of views within
its ranks. That changed dramatically by the 1990s. According to
Professors Fleisher and Bond, the number of moderate and liberal
99. Id.
100. See Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Filibuster, 49 STAN. L. REV. 181,
206 (1997) (“The two-track system developed by Mansfield may have benefitted the majority in
the short run, but its long-term consequences for the Senate have been disastrous. First . . . it
has reduced the cost of filibustering and thus encouraged strategic filibusters.”).
101. Id. at 210.
102. See Senator Tom Harkin, Filibuster Reform: Curbing Abuse to Prevent Minority
Tyranny in the Senate, 14 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 1, 3 (2011) (“Throughout my career,
there have certainly been ideological differences and policy disagreements, but the leadership of
the minority—sometimes Democrats and sometimes Republicans—while working to protect
the broad interests of the minority, worked with the majority to make the system work.”).
103. See MANN & ORNSTEIN, WORSE THAN IT LOOKS, supra note 31, at 87–88 (noting
data showing that fewer than two cloture motions had to be filed to attempt to break filibusters
in the 1970s, increasing to three per month in the 1980s, and growing even more during the
Clinton Administration in the 1990s).
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Republicans in the Senate shrunk from twenty-two in the 1960s to
seven by the 1990s, while the ranks of moderate and conservative
Democrats decreased from twenty-three to three in the same
period.104 As they explain:
Until the early 1980s in both the House and the Senate, each party
contained substantial numbers of members with ideological predispositions outside their party mainstream. During the 1980s, the
number of moderate and cross-pressured members began to decline
in both parties in both chambers. This trend accelerated in the
1990s, as the number of moderate and cross-pressured members
plummeted. Crosspressured liberal Republicans and conservative
Democrats have all but disappeared from Congress.105

When the ideology of the parties had substantial overlap, and
each party was thus more ideologically diverse, it was far less likely
that either party could sustain a strategy of constant or even frequent
filibusters, because it takes a combination of party loyalty and relatively high ideological concurrence to keep to the program prescribed by the caucus’ leadership.
Thus, extreme ideological polarization of the parties in the Senate gave rise to the partisan use of the filibuster as a routine tool of
both delay and obstruction.106 These have not always been the same
thing; some filibusters are not intended primarily to actually prevent
enactment of the legislation at issue, but rather to simply slow down
the routine business of the Senate, to use up the days in which the
Senate is in session so that the majority can accomplish less.107 What
other purpose than delay for its own sake can explain filibusters of

104. See Richard Fleisher & John R. Bond, The Shrinking Middle in the US Congress,
34 BRIT. J. POL. SCI. 429, 436 tbl.1 (2004).
105. Id. at 435.
106. The breakdown in comity that has accompanied ideological polarization has also
resulted in other uses (or misuses) of Senate rules, besides the filibuster, to delay routine business in ways that can only be characterized as petty and harmful to the nation’s business. See
Shaheen, supra note 95, at 9 (describing actions of anonymous Senate Republicans in refusing
to agree to traditional unanimous consent motions allowing Senate committees to meet while
Senate was in session, which prevented Armed Services Committee and Homeland Security
Subcommittee from meeting even though military personnel had traveled from overseas to testify).
107. See Harkin, supra note 102 at 4–5 (noting that the “once rare tactic is now used or
threatened to be used on virtually every measure and nominee, even those that enjoy nearuniversal support,” including bills and nominations that ultimately passed 98-0 and 99-0 after
the filibuster had served its purpose of delay).
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bills that ultimately pass by votes of ninety-eight to zero, ninety to
five, and ninety-two to four—but only after critical days of floor time
have been wasted?108
The filibuster’s potential to paralyze the Senate and delay its
business even when a bill enjoys broad support is magnified by the
Senate’s tradition of deferring to even a single Senator’s notice that
he or she wishes to place a “hold” on a measure the Majority Leader
would otherwise bring to the floor for consideration.109 Because a
hold comes with the implicit threat of a filibuster, and the inevitable
delay in accomplishing other essential Senate business that would result, “the threat of a filibuster often is sufficient to prevent a bill from
coming to the Senate floor.”110
So what do we get in this new era of extreme polarization between the parties, and the frequent use of holds to delay the Senate’s
business? The troubling trend of increasing filibusters that marked
the last quarter of the 20th century has given way to an avalanche of
filibusters in which it has simply become routine that virtually every
bill of any substance must have at least sixty votes to even be considered, much less pass—and to even get to that stage, the majority
is willing to force the issue over any hold that a single Senator
may place on the bill.111 Because of the “de facto 60 vote rule,” during
the 111th to the 113th Congress, “the percentage of Senate floor
activity devoted to cloture votes has been more than 50 percent
greater than any other time since at least World War II, leaving less

108. See MANN & ORNSTEIN, WORSE THAN IT LOOKS, supra note 31, at 90–91 (discussing three bills from the 111th Congress that ultimately passed the Senate easily but only
after time-wasting filibusters).
109. See Valerie Heitshusen & Richard S. Beth, Filibusters and Cloture in the Senate, 1
CONG. RES. SERV. 22, 20-21 (2017), https://www.senate.gov/CRSpubs/3d51be23-64f8-448eaa14-10ef0f94b77e.pdf (discussing the impact of holds as a means of signaling a Senator’s intent
to filibuster because “a Senator who objects to allowing the bill or resolution to be called up . . .
may back up his or her objection by filibustering a motion to proceed to its consideration,” and
thus “majority leaders have accordingly tended to honor holds . . . in recognition that if they
choose not to do so, they may well confront filibusters that they prefer to avoid”).
110. Id. at 21. See also MANN & ORNSTEIN, WORSE THAN IT LOOKS, supra note 31, at
84–85 (discussing the ways in which the use of “holds” has exacerbated the filibuster problem).
111. See Mimi Marziani, Jonathan Backer & Diana Kasdan, Curbing Filibuster Abuse, 1
BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. 15, 1 (2012), (“Even routine legislative matters and governmental
appointments are frozen. As a matter of practice, a de facto 60-vote ‘supermajority’ requirement
applies to all legislation.”).
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time for consideration of substantive measures.”112 Then there is this
astonishing fact:
Since 2006 [through 2012], 385 cloture motions have been filed.
This is greater than the total number of cloture motions filed in the
70 years between 1917 (when the Cloture Rule was created) and
1988 (the last year of Ronald Reagan’s presidency). But this measure underestimates the frequency of filibusters, as it does not even
account for bills that are abandoned or nominations that are withdrawn due to the mere threat of a filibuster.113

Put another way: while filibusters increased markedly prior to 2006,
cloture votes still never constituted more than 10% of total floor
votes in any Congress (and usually significantly less). And since 2006,
the increase has only accelerated. “[O]ver the past three Congresses,
cloture votes have averaged more than 15 percent of all recorded
votes — a 50 percent increase over the previous high during the first
two years of President George W. Bush’s administration.”114 So the
“previous high” came during the term of the 43rd President, and that
dubious record of senatorial obstruction was then promptly (and repeatedly) bested during that of the 44th. We have entered an era in
which the country’s business simply cannot get done, regardless of
which party is in the majority, which party is in the White House,
and whose programmatic ox is being gored.
In truth, it is difficult to quantify exactly how many filibusters are
being conducted. This is in part because the mere threat of a filibuster, in the form of a hold on a bill placed by a Senator, can be sufficient to make a filibuster unnecessary. The Majority Leader may either realize it will be futile to attempt to bring the bill to the floor,
since the votes are not there to overcome the implicit filibuster
threat, or he may decide that the time-consuming steps that are required under Senate rules are simply not worth it, given the press of

112. Id. at 2.
113. Id. at 4 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). A cloture motion is provided for in
Rule XXII(2) of the Senate’s Standing Rules, and it requires the concurrence of three-fifths of
the Senate (i.e., 60 votes) to vote aye to the question, “Is it the sense of the Senate that the debate shall be brought to a close?” See Rule XXII(2), Rules of the Senate, available at
https://www.rules.senate.gov/rules-of-the-senate.
114. Marziani, Jonathan & Kasdan, supra note 111, at 6.
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other Senate business.115 Cloture motions are a rough proxy, but only
a proxy, because
there has not been one cloture motion for each filibuster. Some filibusters have not provoked a single cloture motion; other filibusters
have been the subject of multiple cloture votes. Some cloture
motions have been filed before there was any real evidence that a
filibuster was in progress or on the Senate’s doorstep. There even
have been cases in which cloture has been filed primarily in the
hope of triggering the germaneness requirement on amendments
that applies under cloture, and not for the purpose of limiting
further debate. Yet even with these reservations, the frequency
of cloture motions and cloture votes is the best and really the
only surrogate for the frequency of filibusters, however defective a
surrogate it may be.116

And as a “best surrogate,” cloture votes tell quite a story, as data provided by Bach to the Senate Rules Committee in 2010 shows:
Number of Cloture Motions Filed/Agreed To
67th-71st Congresses (1921-1931) 11/3
72nd-76th Congresses (1931-1940) 4/0
77th-81st Congresses (1941-1950) 12/2
82nd-86th Congresses (1951-1960) 2/0
87th-91st Congresses (1961-1970) 28/4
92nd-96th Congresses (1971-1980)166/43
97th-101st Congresses (1981-1990) 207/54
102nd-106th Congresses (1991-2000) 358/92
107th-111th (1st Session) Congress (2001-2009) 435/175117
There were only fifty-seven cloture motions filed in the five decades
from 1921 to 1970. Since then, the pace of their filing—and it is fair
to infer, the pace of the underlying filibusters and threats of filibusters that have provoked the need to attempt to invoke cloture—has
accelerated. There were more cloture motions in the few short years

115. See Examining the Filibuster: Hearings Before the Comm. on Rules & Admin.,
111th Cong., 2nd Sess. 74 (2010) (testimony of Stanley Bach discussing impact of holds in rendering actual filibuster unnecessary).
116. Id.
117. Id.
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from 2001 to 2009 (435) than there were in the sixty-nine years from
1921 to 1990 (430). The Senate is simply not working as it should
when delay becomes the norm by which business is conducted.

B. Borrowing from the State Constitutional Toolbox: The TwoCongress Solution
The conundrum we face is how to preserve the Senate’s role as a
forum for careful consideration of the ideas of the time, while eliminating the filibuster because it has become unusable in this age of
partisan division. The answer is to be found in Louis Brandeis’ “laboratories of democracy”—the states.118 Many state constitutions include a mechanism for amendment that can be utilized, with some
small adjustments, for use in the federal legislative process. Transformed for our purposes, it would look like this:
Amendment XXIX
Sec. 1. Any bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives in consecutive Congresses which is not voted upon by the full
Senate during the first Congress shall, in the second Congress, be
exempt from any Senate rule of procedure requiring that it receive
more than a simple majority to be considered or passed. Upon motion of any member of the Senate, the Senate shall consider any
such exempt bill prior to final adjournment for that session of Congress, and in all cases no later than 60 calendar days after such motion having been made, and passage of the bill shall require no more
than a simple majority of the Senators eligible to vote. Once the required Senate vote is held, if the bill does not pass, its exemption
from normal Senate rules of procedure shall not carry over to any
subsequent Congresses.
Sec. 2. The Senate may amend any bill whose consideration is mandated pursuant to Section 1 of this provision, but no amendment
may be considered until the bill as passed by the House of Representatives has been subject to a vote in the Senate, and passage by a
simple majority shall be sufficient to render the bill passed by both
Houses. The Senate may then consider amendments, and any

118. See New State Ice Co. v. Leibman, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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passed by the Senate shall be considered by the House, and if passed
by the House shall become part of the final legislation.

Before we consider this proposal, however, let us pause to assess
whether some non-constitutional ideas for reform of the Senate’s
own rules can handle the task. After all, if there are alternatives to
amending the Constitution that can solve a vexing problem, it is difficult to make the case for resorting to Article V.119
One such proposal was advanced by the authors of the Brennan
Center’s stinging critique of the Senatorial status quo. They propose
reforming Senate rules, so that:
The Rules should place a burden on those obstructing action preferred by the majority. This can be accomplished by amending the
Senate Rules to require at least 40 votes to sustain a filibuster rather
than requiring a supermajority to break a filibuster. Similarly, filibustering senators should be required to stay on the Senate floor
and actually debate, as was true in the past. By ensuring that there
are costs associated with the filibuster, the minority will be forced
to decide what issues merit the time, energy, and lost political capital of obstruction.120

Unfortunately, such well-intentioned proposals are inadequate to
the task at hand, for at least three reasons. First, the Senate has
proved itself incapable of adopting any new rule to curb filibusters of
legislation. The fact is that Senators like the power that accrues to
them as single members of the Senate to delay the agenda of their
colleagues (and that of the President). They can utilize the leverage
the rules provide to gain concessions on matters of importance to
them, things they could not otherwise obtain. In the real world, we
call this blackmail—when one takes advantage of leverage he or she
should not legitimately possess to force others to give up things the

119. U.S. CONST. art. V (“The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem
it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments,
which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution,
when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in
three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the
Congress False”).
120. Marziani, Jonathan & Kasdan, supra note 111, at 11; see also Shaheen, supra note 95,
at 17 (arguing that putting the burden on the minority to find forty-one votes to sustain a filibuster “would be the single most effective change we could make,” because “[t]he burden
should be on those who want to delay action to show up and vote”).
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blackmailer wants. Individual Senators, or minorities, like having the
power to stop the legislative majority in its tracks, but this is no reason for the country to let them keep it. It is a reason they will not
give it up via a meaningful change in Senate rules, however, making it
necessary that we take it away from them via constitutional change.
One might think that the Senate majority would grow tired of
having its business constantly held up, and eventually enact real reform (on the order of that suggested by Marziani, Backer, and
Kasdan), even if it means giving up the precious prerogatives they enjoy so much in their capacity as individual Senators. But recent history tells us with near-absolute certainty that even when Senators are in
a comfortable majority, many fear the time when they might again be
in the minority and—if they weaken the filibuster—unable to stop
the agenda of those on the other side.121
The answer to this peculiar position, is that if you are afraid of
the legislation the other side may pass, if and once they are in the majority . . . win elections! If you do not want the other side to be able
to enact its agenda, win or retain control of the Senate. Or control
the House, so that even if a bill you do not like passes the Senate, it
can be defeated or changed in the House. Or, control the Presidency,
with its precious veto power.122 As I will discuss, the Senate should
have a deliberative process. But deliberation is not the same as obstruction, and it is the latter we are seeing. Even when they are in the
majority, Senators are holding fast to the power to obstruct simply
because they know they will want to be able to obstruct when the
other side is on top. This tells us that the goal is not to deliberate.
What drives Senators to preserve the filibuster system is, in other
words, the furthest thing from a desire to maintain a deliberative pro-

121. See Ezra Klein, Why Filibuster Reform Failed, and Where It Might Go Next,
WASH. POST (Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/01/24
/why-filibuster-reform-failed-and-where-it-might-go-next/ (“The reason there wasn’t rootand-branch reform of the filibuster is that most Senate Democrats didn’t want root-and-branch
reform of the filibuster. ‘Do not underestimate how much appreciation for the filibuster there is
among senators who have been in the minority of this body and have been able to hold up legislation,’ one Senate aide told me.”).
122. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the
United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to
that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their
Journal, and proceed to reconsider it.”).
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cess. The Senators want to rig the game so that deliberation doesn’t
happen—not real deliberation. The Republican Senate Minority
Leader had no interest in deliberation when he said, more than two
years before the upcoming presidential election, that his primary goal
was not to subject the President’s agenda to appropriate deliberation,
but to see that the President of the opposing party would be “a oneterm President.”123 And the members of the Democratic majority, for
their part, were no more interested in deliberation, given their unwillingness to actually assume the power to govern as a majority by
changing the filibuster rules because they were determined to preserve the future, hypothetical right to block the agenda of a future,
hypothetical GOP majority.
Second, even if the Senate was willing and ready to adopt a reform package, there is not much meat to a proposal that simply says
that a filibuster must be sustained by forty votes, instead of ended by
sixty, and that the filibustering Senators must stay on the floor and
actually filibuster. Granted, it would force those who want to keep
the delay going to be available for the votes, and seek to ensure that
only actual filibusters rather than their threat would bring about genuine delay. Making the filibuster painful, or at least forcing the obstructionists to put some effort into it, has its benefits.
But in a deeply polarized political climate, the benefits of obstruction are simply too great to make it plausible that Senators in
the minority will stand down even if compelled to actually marshal
their forces and mount real, live, old-fashioned filibusters. The tool
must instead be forcibly taken away from them.
Third, constitutional solutions are—Prohibition notwithstand124
ing —permanent. Changes to Senate rules are more ephemeral.
A constitutional requirement of the kind that I propose in the 29th
Amendment, requiring that the Senate must take up certain bills
and consider them by a simple majority vote, is not one that the
Senate could, by itself, unilaterally alter125 when the political
climate permitted.

123. See Michael A. Memoli, Mitch McConnell’s Remarks on 2012 Draw White House’s
Ire, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 27, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct/27/news/la-pn-obamamcconnell-20101027.
124. See U.S. CONST. amends. XVII, XIX (enacting and repealing Prohibition).
125. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2 (“Each House may determine the Rules of its Pro-
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For these reasons, reform must not be left to a Senate unwilling
or unable to change its stripes, a Senate committed to a system that
no longer works to produce the sort of deliberative consideration of
the nation’s business that the Framers envisioned. It must be constitutional change, and it should compel the Senate to consider legislation when there is a clear indication that enough time and attention
has been given to the proposed bill to justify forcing the Senate to
vote on a measure. As I indicated at the outset of this section, an effective mechanism to accomplish that goal can be found in many state
constitutional provisions.
Take, for example, Article X, Section 1 of the Iowa Constitution.
It provides that a proposed constitutional amendment must first be
agreed to by a majority of both houses of the General Assembly, and
then by majority votes of both houses again after the next election, at
which point the proposed amendment is referred to the voters for
their approval.126 I will refer to this as the “two-Congress” or “twosession” approach: the core idea is that before the state will change its
foundational law, the proposal should go through a careful deliberative process—one that includes consideration not just by a single session of the state Legislature. Then moving on to a vote by the citizens, but also including consideration by a subsequent session, one
that meets after an intervening election. As Article X makes clear, the
public that votes in that intervening election must receive published
notice of the amendment that will be up for “final” legislative debate
(or “second reading,” if you prefer).127
ceedings . . . .”).
126. IOWA CONST. art. X, § 1 (“Any amendment or amendments to this constitution may
be proposed in either house of the general assembly; and if the same shall be agreed to by a majority of the members elected to each of the two houses, such proposed amendment shall be
entered on their journals, with the yeas and nays taken thereon, and referred to the legislature
to be chosen at the next general election, and shall be published, as provided by law, for three
months previous to the time of making such choice; and if, in the general assembly so next chosen as aforesaid, such proposed amendment or amendments shall be agreed to, by a majority of
all the members elected to each house, then it shall be the duty of the general assembly to submit such proposed amendment or amendments to the people, in such manner, and at such time
as the general assembly shall provide; and if the people shall approve and ratify such amendment or amendments, by a majority of the electors qualified to vote for members of the general
assembly, voting thereon, such amendment or amendments shall become a part of the constitution of this state.”).
127. See id. (providing the proposed amendment shall be “referred to the legislature to be
chosen at the next general election, and shall be published, as provided by law, for three months
previous to the time of making such choice”).
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Everything about the two-session approach screams that its goal
is to provide ample opportunity for the state’s political system to fully
assess the pros and cons and the impact of the proposed amendment.
That is, to provide an opportunity for deliberation. The Iowa General Assembly gets two looks at the proposal, with an election in between the two evaluations. The voters also get two cracks at it. The
first—somewhat indirect look—comes during the legislative election,
during which the State Constitution requires they be given explicit
notice of the initial passage of the proposed constitutional amendment. This means that, if they choose, the voters can make opposition to the amendment a major election issue, turning out the incumbents who supported it and electing challengers who promise to
oppose it. Or, conversely, the voters can opt to return those legislators to office to give the amendment the strongest possible chance of
being given the required second thumbs-up before moving on to the
referendum. Either way, the point is that the electorate can decide to
make the General Assembly’s consideration of the proposed amendment a key election issue. The voters’ second, more direct opportunity to deliberate about the proposal comes if and when it passes the
second time through the General Assembly. Even after running that
gauntlet through both Houses, receiving majority passage in each one
twice, the proposal must still win a referendum at the polls.
This process can be seen as an alternative to the high barriers that
Article V of the federal Constitution erects for passing an amendment. Under the typical process, an amendment must be approved by
two-thirds majorities of both Houses and then ratified by threefourths of the States.128 Since the state-by-state ratification hurdle is
not readily transferable to the states, the two-session approach is one
way to replicate the general principle that it should be relatively difficult to effect constitutional change, and that such change should take
place only after careful consideration.
Thus, it is not surprising that this device is not limited to Iowa.
To the contrary, it is utilized in various forms in seventeen states.
Twelve of these states require passage in two sessions of their legislatures as a requirement.129 Most, but not all of these states, then re128. See U.S. CONST. art. V.
129. See DEL. CONST. art. XVI, § 1 (passage by 2/3 majority in both Houses in consecutive sessions; no ballot required by citizenry); IND. CONST. art. XVI, § 1 (passage by majority of
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quire the voters of the state to approve the amendment in a subsequent referendum. Four other states (Connecticut, Hawaii, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania) make the two-session process an alternative. If
the proposed amendment passes by a super-majority in both Houses,
it need pass in only one session before going to the voters. But if the
proposal can muster only a simple majority in either House, then it
must pass again in a second session.130
The two-session solution can be adapted to replace the filibuster,
avoiding the obstructionism that has devastated Congress’ ability to
do the people’s business while reinforcing the Senate’s role as a deliberative body. When a bill passes the House during one Congress,
the Senate has a full range of options as it deliberates over the merits
of the proposal. For example, if convinced a bill makes little sense,
the Senate can bottle up the bill in committee and never take it up.
both Houses in consecutive sessions, then sent to voters for approval); MASS. CONST. art.
XLVIII, c. IV, §§ 4–5 (amendment proposal introduced by member of legislature must be approved by majority of both Houses in consecutive sessions, then by voters in ballot referendum); NEV. CONST. art. XVI, § 1 (passage by majority of both Houses in consecutive sessions,
then sent to voters for approval, with provisions for handling multiple proposals on same subject that may go before voters at the same time); N.Y. CONST. art. XIX, § 1 (passage by a majority of both Houses in consecutive sessions, then sent to voters for approval); PA. CONST. art.
XI, § 1 (passage by a simple majority in both Houses in consecutive sessions, then sent to voters
for approval, with exception allowing for passage in one session by 2/3 majority of both Houses,
if legislature declares a major emergency which threatens the Commonwealth, with approval of
voters still required); S.C. CONST. art. XVI, § 1 (passage by 2/3 majority of both Houses, which
sends proposed amendment to the voters; if it passes by majority, it returns to Legislature in
next session where it must pass by simple majority of both Houses); TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 3
(passage by a simple majority of both Houses in the first session, and then by a 2/3 majority of
both Houses in the next session; then sent to the voters for passage by referendum); VT.
CONST. ch. II, § 72 (passage by a 2/3 majority of the Senate and simple majority of the House
in the first session, then by simple majority of both Houses in the second session; then sent to
the voters for passage by referendum); VA. CONST. art. XII, § 1 (passage by simple majority in
both Houses in consecutive sessions, then sent to voters for passage by referendum); WIS.
CONST. art. XII, § 1 (passage by simple majority in both Houses in consecutive sessions, then
sent to voters for passage by referendum).
130. See CONN. CONST. art. XII (passage can occur in one session if both Houses do so
by 75% majority; otherwise, amendment must be passed by simple majority of both Houses in
consecutive sessions and then sent to voters for passage by referendum); HAW. CONST. art.
XVII, § 3 (passage can occur in one session if both Houses do so by 2/3 majority; otherwise,
amendment must be passed by simple majority of both Houses in consecutive sessions and then
sent to voters for passage by referendum); N.J. CONST. art. IX, ¶ 1 (passage can occur in one
session if both Houses do so by 60% majority; otherwise, amendment must be passed by simple
majority of both Houses in consecutive sessions and then sent to voters for passage by referendum); PA. CONST. art. XI, § 1 (normally requires passage in consecutive sessions by simple majority of both Houses, but Legislature can declare an emergency which threatens the Commonwealth and pass an amendment by 2/3 majority of both Houses in a single session and send
proposal to voters for passage in a referendum).
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The Senate can also allow the bill to come to the floor for debate,
with amendments offered—but perhaps rejecting it on the basis that
it is ill-advised or that more consideration is needed (both in
Congress and across the country). The bill might pass the Senate,
but in amended form, and the two versions might not be
reconciled for final passage and ultimately sent on to the President
for his or her consideration.
A Senate minority could also, under its rules and traditions, filibuster the bill, requiring sixty Senators to vote to end debate.131 A
proposal that passes overwhelmingly in the House, and enjoys bipartisan support of a majority of Senators, might not be able to clear the
legislative process because of the ability of the minority to clog the
process and prevent a vote from ever taking place on the Senate floor.
Some think that this limited use of the filibuster should not be
changed, based on the notion that it is the Senate’s job to slow down
the pace of the nation’s legislative work. There are times when the
nation benefits from having the passions behind an idea cool-off, allowing longer-term values to reassert themselves in the debate. This
allows time for discussion of additional proposals that might not have
appeared upon initial consideration.132 What supporters of a bill see
as “obstructive” use of the Senate’s rules can just as readily be construed as fulfillment of the Senate’s core role. It is fair to give the
benefit of the doubt to a filibuster that commands the loyal support
of more than forty Senators (and thus cannot be broken by a successful cloture motion)—for a time.
That time should not be unlimited. At some point in a deliberative process, a democratically self-governing people have the right to
say that we have deliberated enough. We have given the minority
sufficient time to convince us that the proposed legislation is a mistake. We are entitled to respond that we remain unconvinced on the
131. See Rule XXII, Precedence of Motions, Rules of the S., http://www.rules.senate.gov/
public/index.cfm?p=RuleXXII (establishing that a motion raising the question, “Is it the sense
of the Senate that the debate shall be brought to a close?” must receive the affirmative vote of
three-fifths of Senators “duly chosen and sworn”.).
132. This notion of the need to have a Senate that can “cool” the passions of the House is
at the heart of the claimed conversation between George Washington (defending the Senate)
and Thomas Jefferson (the skeptic). See Dan T. Coenen, The Filibuster and the Framing: Why
the Cloture Rule Is Unconstitutional and What to Do About It, 55 B.C. L. REV. 39, 82–83
(2014) (relating Washington’s portrayal of “the Senate as a saucer into which the heated actions
of the House are wisely poured to cool.”).
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merits of their argument. With the revised filibuster, the minority
will have had the entirety of one Congress to utilize the delay the filibuster gives them to make their case against the bill. If in the intervening election, the American people return to office a House majority still committed to the bill they passed in the prior Congress, and
the bill then passes again, the minority should not be able to resort to
delaying tactics.
To argue against this is to assert that Senate opponents of a bill,
in the minority, should be able to use the filibuster to prevent a vote
on it in perpetuity. That claim transforms the filibuster from a tool to
promote deliberation into one suited only for obstruction. A 2010
Senate Rules Committee Hearing looking at filibuster reform proposals is instructive on this point. Several Senators spoke in defense
of the filibuster, and almost every one of them did so by pointing to
the importance of allowing for full, measured consideration of major
bills of critical national importance.133 If the filibuster’s predominant
defense includes ensuring deliberate consideration of legislation, that
defense does not support a filibuster which actually permits endless
obstruction. This dissonance between the use of the filibuster, and
the defenses presented for it, strips away the benefit of the doubt I
granted in the first place in allowing for the filibuster to continue to
play a role in blocking votes on legislation for the duration of an entire Congress. Once our two-session (or two-Congress) requirement
has been cleared, those blocking action in the Senate should no
longer operate with the benefit of the doubt. Seventeen states
already employ this requirement during deliberations concerning
constitutional amendments.
Under the proposed 29th Amendment, the House would have the
option of repassing any bill that it had passed in the prior Congress

133. See Examining the Filibuster, supra note 115, at 6-7 (“In sum, the founders purposefully crafted the Senate to be a deliberate, thoughtful body. A supermajority requirement to cut
off the right to debate ensures that wise purpose. Eliminating it is a bad idea.”) (opening statement of Senator McConnell); at 12 (“The filibuster is the essence of the Senate. It is not a tool
of obstructionism or dysfunction. It is meant to foster greater consultation, consensus and cooperation between the parties. It is a means for the minority to make its voice heard and to contribute to debate and amend legislation before the Senate.”) (opening statement of Senator
Roberts); at 14 (“[Filibuster reform would remove] legislative hurdles that are the reason this
body is regarded as a guardian of checks and balances, and separation of powers”; decrying
“[a]ny reform effort which attempts to weaken the protections of minority rights and further
enable fast-tracked legislating.”) (opening statement of Senator Chambliss).
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which failed to receive a vote in the Senate. This would compel the
Senate to act on the bill within sixty days, assuming at least one
member of the Senate moves to bring the bill to the floor. It would
not require the Senate to pass the bill. Repassage by the House would
simply overcome the traditional prerogative of a minority of the Senate to prevent a Senate majority from taking up the bill. A majority of
the Senate could still defeat the bill if it so chose on a simple vote on
the Senate floor.
The Amendment would also ensure that a single Senator could
not place a “hold” on the bill with the implicit threat that a filibuster
could follow, a threat that has rendered Majority Leaders in recent
years typically unable to simply ignore such hold requests.134 Under
the 29th Amendment, a single Senator’s motion to take up an exempt
bill would constitutionally require the Senate to do so within sixty
days, trumping any hold request. In effect, the tables would
be turned; instead of a single Senator being able to hold up legislation, a single Senator would be able to force legislation to the floor
for a vote.
The most important impact of the 29th Amendment, in my view,
would be to change the leverage of each side of the filibuster debate
during the first Congress during which a particular bill passes the
House. Under the existing rules, a determined and cohesive minority
in the Senate can delay long enough to simply kill off a bill for the
entirety of a Congress. After all, when a Congress adjourns at the end
of its second session, legislation dies if it has not passed both House
and Senate. There is little incentive for the Senate minority to compromise on bills it opposes, because in a polarized political climate
Senators in the minority gain more by successfully opposing the
agenda of the majority party than by reaching an accommodation in
the middle.
But under the 29th Amendment, Senators in the minority would
have far less to gain from delay. Killing the bill in the 115th Congress
does not actually kill the bill—it may well come back in the 116th
Congress, passed by the House again, this time turbo-charged with a
newly-acquired exemption from the filibuster. Nevertheless, during

134. See supra pp. 135-137 (discussing impact of “holds” by which even a single Senator
can delay the Senate’s business inordinately).

273

MARCOSSON, FOR PUBLICIATION, 4.27.19.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

BYU Journal of Public Law

5/20/2019 5:28 PM

[Vol. 33

the 115th Congress, the filibuster would remain an effective bargaining chip, since the bill’s supporters would want to avoid the delay—
particularly in the case of legislation being considered early in one
Congress. The next Congress will not be elected for close to two
years, and the bill’s supporters would often be anxious to make concessions to avoid that delay. They could also not be sure, or even
confident, that they will continue to hold the House and thus be able
to pass the bill again at all in the next Congress.
So, the bill’s supporters would want to compromise with those
who filibuster or threaten to do so during the first Congress, because
they would be uncertain of their position in the next Congress. And
the filibusterers would also want to compromise, because they too
would be uncertain of their position. If they do not change the composition of Congress in the intervening election, and the bill passes
the House again, the filibuster will be lost, filibusterers’ leverage will
be gone, and they will no longer be able to delay a bill they oppose.
Consequently, filibusterers would have to kill the bill or at least force
changes in it. When both sides have maximum incentive to compromise, the legislative process can work. In a nutshell, the uncertainty
over the conditions that will govern the rules in the subsequent Congress would make both the majority and the minority more willing to
deal under the certain conditions they face in the current Congress.
Senator Lamar Alexander’s candid comments at a 2010 Committee hearing on filibuster reform about the real political calculation
surrounding the use of the filibuster demonstrate the importance of
tailoring reform to the political realities of legislative bargaining. Alexander’s questioning of former Senate staff member Stanley Bach,
an expert on Senate procedure and history, produced this exchange:
Senator ALEXANDER. Mr. Bach, unless the majority believes the
minority is willing to kill a bill, how can it persuade the majority to
take it seriously in changing the bill? When you said a filibuster
might be all right if you are only going to do it to improve the bill
but the way you get the attention of the majority is to say, if you do
not, we will kill it.
Mr. BACH. This is the issue that Senator Bennett raised earlier,
what is the minority’s true intention, to kill or to compromise.
Senator ALEXANDER. How are you going to determine that?
That is just a matter of human nature.
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Mr. BACH. No one on the outside can determine that. That is a
question that only Senators can determine in looking at what they
and their colleagues are doing.
Senator ALEXANDER. But is it not a fairly simple rule of human
nature that if you do not think I am serious you are not going to pay
any attention to me.
Mr. BACH. Yes, it is.
Senator ALEXANDER. We all know that. Look at the financial reform bill debate right now. Forty-one Republicans have signed a
letter saying, you know, we might filibuster this if you do not let us
have some participation in making it a better bill. If the Democrats
think there is no chance to we will do that— the only reason we
think we are getting a chance at some participation is they think we
might actually do that.135

Legislatures work on the basis of leverage, bargaining, and compromise. Senator Alexander’s point in his discussion with Bach was
that the minority has to be able to threaten (and convince the majority it is serious and will follow through) to induce the majority to
compromise over the bill, and thus achieve a bipartisan consensus to
pass it. If the majority either does not need their votes (because the
filibuster has been eliminated) or does not believe they can or will
follow through on the threat, then the minority has no power, and
the majority can do whatever it wants, as quickly as it wants.
One need not accept Senator Alexander’s implied narrative that
constant Republican filibusters during the Obama Administration
were simply an attempt to create a strong bargaining position. And
that Republicans were, all along, willing to meaningfully compromise
on virtually all the major legislation they opposed (from health care
reform to Dodd-Frank to the stimulus package). Alexander’s claim is
less than credible in light of the GOP’s unwillingness to provide
votes for compromise proposals on these issues,136 and the clear

135. Examining the Filibuster, supra note 115, at 32 (questioning of witness Stanley I.
Bach by Sen. Lamar Alexander).
136. See Norm Ornstein, The Real Story of Obamacare’s Birth, THE ATLANTIC (July 6,
2015),https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/07/the-real-story-of-obamacaresbirth/397742/. Ornstein notes that the Obama Administration spent months while the bill was
pending in the Senate awaiting the outcome of negotiations between Finance Committee
Chairman Max Baucus and several Republicans—especially ranking member Charles Grassley
of Iowa—which ultimately proved fruitless despite Baucus’ attempts to craft a compromise
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statements of Senator McConnell and other GOP Senators that their
strategy was one of partisan opposition from the outset.137 But the
dysfunction of recent practice does not fatally undermine—indeed, it
supports—the point that if we are to restore the Senate to a reasonable semblance of functionality, we need to create a system in which
both sides are operating within a structure that gives them powerful
incentives to actually compromise.
Of course, the two-Congress approach is not a solution to the
misuse of the filibuster in all political seasons. For instance, it would
be of least value in cases where the House is likely to pass bills that
the Senate majority does not support. From 2011-2015, for example,
the House was held by a Republican majority implacably opposed to
the agenda of the Obama Administration, while Democrats held the
majority in the Senate. While the GOP minority in the Senate used
the filibuster repeatedly to block Democratic initiatives, it was generally in tandem with, not in opposition to, the work of the House majority. In a situation like this, the 29th Amendment’s most likely benefit would be to allow the party controlling the House to force floor
votes in the Senate on bills that passed the House in both the 112th

around principles that had been part of proposals once championed by Republicans. These discussions foundered because “Republican Leader Mitch McConnell had warned both Grassley
and Enzi that their futures in the Senate would be much dimmer if they moved toward a deal
with the Democrats that would produce legislation to be signed by Barack Obama. They both
listened to their leader.” Id.
137. See Sam Stein, Robert Draper Book: GOP’s Anti-Obama Campaign Started Night
of Inauguration, THE HUFFINGTON POST (April 25, 2012), http://www.huffingtonpost.com
/2012/04/25/robert-draper-anti-obama-campaign_n_1452899.html (discussing story told in
Robert Draper’s book, “Do Not Ask What Good We Do: Inside the U.S. House of Representatives,” showing, “As President Barack Obama was celebrating his inauguration at various balls,
top Republican lawmakers and strategists were conjuring up ways to submarine his presidency
at a private dinner in Washington.”); Michael A. Memoli, Mitch McConnell’s Remarks on 2012
Draw White House Ire, THE L.A.TIMES, (Oct. 27, 2010), http://articles.latimes.com/2010/oct
/27/news/la-pn-obama-mcconnell-20101027 (quoting Sen. Mitch McConnell (R., Ky), that,
“[T]he single most important thing we want to achieve is for President Obama to be a one-term
president.”). Senator McConnell’s determination to seek partisan gain by opposing anything
and everything proposed by President Obama manifested itself even before Obama took office.
See Greg Sargent, Biden: McConnell Decided to Deny Us Cooperation Before We Took Office, WASHINGTON POST, August (Aug. 10, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs
/plum-line/post/biden-mcconnell-decided-to-withhold-all-cooperation-even-before-we-tookoffice/2012/08/10/64e9a138-e302-11e1-98e7-89d659f9c106_blog.html (discussing book “The
New Deal” by Michael Grunwald, in which Vice President Biden relates that seven GOP Senators told him, “Joe, I’m not going to be able to help you on anything,” because “McConnell had
demanded unified resistance,” which McConnell saw as the Republicans’ “ticket to coming
back.”).
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Congress (2011-2013) and the 113th Congress (2013-2015) and were
kept from the floor not by filibusters but by adverse committee action
and the scheduling authority of the Majority Leader.
But even this limited impact is worthwhile. This use of the 29th
Amendment adds accountability by forcing Senators to take a stand
on the record, with an official vote on the bill.138 Presumably, given
the wide policy differences between the Senate and the House, these
votes would not actually result in many (if any) House bills passing,
but even this might not be certain. When the Senate and House are
in opposite partisan camps, the leadership of the House has little if
any incentive to moderate the content of the bills that pass the
House, since such outreach in the direction of compromise does not
appeal to the base of the party and then has no pay-off in improving
the chances of the bill making it through the Senate.
The 29th Amendment could change the political calculus. On at
least some issues, the House leadership could write bills in such a way
that could seek to tempt cross-over votes in the Senate (with the sideeffect that it might even promote bipartisanship in the House as well,
even if this was not the immediate goal). Even if the Senate leadership could block a vote (using a filibuster or other means) during the
first Congress, those tools would be unavailable in the second Congress—but only if the bills are identical (since the Amendment requires that the bill passed in the second Congress be the same as that
passed in the first to be entitled to the filibuster exemption). Thus,
moderation would be encouraged from the time bills are drafted, debated, and passed in the House.
Consider the Republicans’ repeated efforts after they took control of the House in the 2010 election to repeal President Obama’s

138. Sparing vulnerable incumbents from having to cast “tough votes” that can be used
against them by challengers is a time-honored tradition in Washington. See Charlie Cook,
Avoiding Tough Votes: The Wimp Factor in Congress, NATIONAL JOURNAL (Jan. 24, 2013),
http://news.yahoo.com/avoiding-tough-votes-wimp-factor-congress-200507060—politics.html
(“For the past two decades, one of the least understood but most important unwritten job requirements for congressional leaders has been to protect their members from difficult and potentially politically costly votes, either in committee or on the floor. Some of the most pressing
policy issues of the day are never voted on or are so diluted that one would be hard-pressed to
use voting records to nail down how any member feels about anything of real consequence.”). I
deem it a virtue of this proposal that it would lessen the ability of members of Congress to
avoid votes in which they take positions for which they can be held accountable.
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signature first-term accomplishment, the Affordable Care Act.139
None of those bills had any chance to be enacted while Democrats
held the Senate and with President Obama in office wielding the veto
pen if it became necessary. But in a world with the 29th Amendment,
there would have been substantial incentive sometime during the
112th Congress for House Republicans to pass a bill which made real
inroads into the Act. While short of outright repeal, the Bill would
propose health care reform more in line with Republican ideas. Such
a bill would have put enormous pressure on Democrats and the
White House to accept revisions to the law. They would have been
faced with the choice to either negotiate around the Republican
bill—and thus achieve a more bipartisan approach and broader national consensus on a key issue—or risk blocking it. There is no
doubt they could have chosen the latter course (since during the
112th Congress, Senate Democrats retained the full authority to refuse to take up a bill passed by the House). But blocking the Housepassed bill, rather than trying to reach a compromise during that
Congress, would mean gambling that the Senate would be able to actually defeat it in the next, 113th Congress. Because if the bill passed
the House the second time around, blocking it would not be an option. The House bill would be entitled to a vote on the floor of the
Senate. All the incentives, on both sides, would be shifted (perhaps
not decisively, but at least significantly) towards compromise and negotiation. Similar stories could be told on environmental regulation
and immigration reform, as well as other issues.
Nevertheless, situations in which control of Congress is split between the parties (and especially in which the parties are as polarized
as they have become in recent years) are not the ones in which the
29th Amendment would have its greatest impact. The more critical
times for its use would be when one party controls the House and
Senate, with a clear mandate from the American people to advance an
agenda, and that agenda is stymied by a minority in the Senate which
uses the filibuster to prevent its key pieces from reaching the Senate
floor. This cynical strategy then forms the foundation of a political

139. See Dierdre Walsh, House Passes 50th Bill to Undo Obamacare, CNN (Mar. 5,
2014), http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2014/03/05/house-passes-50th-bill-to-undo-obama
care/.
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campaign against the majority, accusing them of failing to solve the
nation’s problems despite their majority status in Congress.
If majority status is going to bring with it political accountability,
it should also be accompanied by genuine authority. For example,
the Republican Party enjoyed majority control of both the House and
Senate during the time between the 104th and 106th Congressional
sessions. That control should have allowed Republicans to enact their
agenda, at least through Congress. Of course, this would have
required the Republicans to negotiate with then Democratic President, Bill Clinton. And given President Clinton’s 1996 re-election
victory, the Republicans would have been tempered in their ability to
claim a genuine and complete mandate. Had the 29th Amendment
been in effect, any bills the House enacted in the 104th Congress
(from 1995-1997) which could not receive a Senate vote due to
Democratic filibusters140 (the Democrats held forty-eight seats)
would have been guaranteed a Senate vote upon repassage in the
105th (from 1997-1999).
I can hear my Democratic friends wailing now: “You mean this
would have meant the passage of the Contract With America? Count
me out!” First of all, that’s not necessarily the case, unless we are assuming that someone would have stolen President Clinton’s veto
pen. But second, we either believe in the idea that democratic institutions should be free to eventually reach decisions and take action, or
we do not. By all means, decisions and action should come only after
due deliberation, but in my view this condition is satisfied by a system
in which a bill must be passed by the House in consecutive Congresses. A bill that reaches that stage under the proposed 29th Amendment
would be subject during the first Congress to the full range of Senatorial delaying tactics available under the traditional rules and practices allowed in the current system, and gets a green light to the Senate floor only in the second Congress. We cannot accept the idea that
elections matter only when we like the election returns. Just as the
29th Amendment would have made for easier sledding in the Senate

140. See SARAH BINDER, POLITICS OR PRINCIPLE?: FILIBUSTERING IN THE UNITED
STATES SENATE 183–84 (1997) (“Throughout the 104th Congress, Democrats used filibusters
and threatened filibusters to block action on the Republican program, including elements of the
House Republicans’ Contract With America.”).
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for the pet projects of the Gingrich Revolution in the 90s, so too
would it have made life easier for the Obama agenda a decade later.
President Obama was swept into office with a strong Democratic
majority in Congress, with the 111th Congress coming into power
with an almost filibuster-proof majority in the Senate and an equally
impressive working majority of 256-178 in the House. Indeed, for a
brief time, the Democrats actually held sixty Senate seats. This
amount was nominally sufficient to invoke cloture and break any
GOP filibuster, but could only work if Democrats remained fully
united. This control lasted from the moment that Senator Al Franken
was sworn in on July 7, 2009 (after his disputed election was finally
settled)141 until January 2010, when Senator Scott Brown won a special election to fill the Massachusetts seat that had been left vacant by
the death of Senator Edward Kennedy.142 Nevertheless, despite this
impressive level of control, Democrats still faced unprecedented unanimity from their Republican opponents in the Senate, who followed
a strategy formulated by Minority Leader Mitch McConnell to find
strength in complete cohesiveness in opposition to the Democratic
agenda.143 This paid off when they were able to repeatedly block Senate votes using their forty-one votes after Senator Brown’s election to
prevent important legislation embodying Democratic priorities from
coming to the floor.144
Under a scenario in which the 29th Amendment had been in
place, the Democrats would have been able to frame the 2010 elec-

141. See Manu Raju, Senator Franken Takes Oath of Office, POLITICO (July 8, 2009),
http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0709/24637.html.
142. See Michael Cooper, G.O.P. Senate Victory Stuns Democrats, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 19,
2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/20/us/politics/20election.html.
143. See Sargent, supra note 137 (discussing claim made by Vice-President Biden that
“seven members of the opposition confided to him that their party had adopted a comprehensive strategy to oppose literally everything the new President did — with the explicit purpose of
denying him any successes of any kind for their own political purposes — even before he took
office.”).
144. See ProgressMass, New Study: ProgressMass Analysis of Scott Brown’s Voting Rec-

ord Reveals Highly Partisan Record, Overwhelming Support for Republican Obstruction in
U.S. Senate (May 7, 2012), (detailing results of http://www.progressmass.org/press/new-studyprogressmass-analysis-of-scott-browns-voting-record-reveals-highly-partisan-recordoverwhe.html), (detailing results of study of Sen. Brown’s voting record showing he had supported forty of fifty-three GOP filibusters on bills that had the support of more than fifty Senators, including thirty of thirty-two prior to the entry of his most serious – and ultimately successful – challenger, Elizabeth Warren, into the race). Almost all of the bills that Sen. Brown
helped the Republicans stop ultimately never received an up-or-down vote in the Senate.
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tions around a series of measures that had passed the House in the
111th Congress, but which Republicans effectively kept from the
Senate floor. These measures included bills that were designed to
further the Administration’s efforts to jumpstart the economy. The
Democrats could have asked the voters to return them with a renewed majority in the 112th Congress so they could repass those
measures in the House and thus vest them with an exemption from
the filibuster in the Senate.
Would this argument have been successful in changing the narrative of the 2010 elections, in which Democrats were overwhelmed
and lost the House and six seats in the Senate (as well as nearly losing
that majority as well)? Perhaps not. But it would have given voters
some basis to believe that a Democratic Congress working with
the Obama Administration could accomplish more from 2010-2012
than it had in the prior two years, and that it could have actually
overcome Republican-induced gridlock rather than simply putting
the country through two more years of it. In short, voters should be
able to hear the message that gridlock is not a permanent feature of
our political system.
Candidates running for office in democratic legislatures should
be able to tell voters that if they are given the responsibility of holding the majority, actual power will come with that responsibility. The
proposed 29th Amendment would give a party that holds the majority
the ability to do that, within reason. The filibuster could slow them
down for the duration of one Congress, respecting the Framers’ wisdom in favoring measured deliberation over important issues. The
minority can elect either to bargain towards compromise, or force a
majority seeking to enact important changes to go to the voters with
a specific program of the legislation they would enact if freed from
the constraints of the filibuster.
The two-Congress proposal bears some similarities to a filibuster
reform approach advanced in 2011 by law professor Gerard Magliocca of the University of Indiana-Indianapolis.145 Professor Magliocca’s
proposal borrowed from the House of Lords’ power to exercise
a “suspensory veto” over legislation passed by the House of

145. See Gerard N. Magliocca, Reforming the Filibuster, 105 N.W. U.L. REV. 303
(2011).
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Commons, which in effect holds up such laws for one year. The history demonstrates how the second look authority that was once held
by the House of Lords, and which evolved into the suspensory veto,
is in some ways consistent with my two-Congress proposal to limit
the filibuster:
They could also reject bills and require the Commons to pass them
again to test the elected majority’s resolve. And on matters of grave
concern, a steadfast rejection would force a general election that
gave voters a chance to decide if a proposal by the Commons deserved support. A norm evolved that if the Commons approved the
controversial bill again after the election, then the Lords would
cease their resistance. In effect, the House of Lords enforced a
“second-look” doctrine that was intended to assess preference intensity but conceded the power of the majority to rule in the end.146

Of course, the filibuster that prevents consideration of a Housepassed bill does not “reject” it in the same way the House of Lords’
exercise of the “second-look” doctrine did. However, both turn
on the notion of allowing the voters to either return the majority
to power to once again pass the contested bill, this time with a
smoother path to passage, or to decide that the upper chamber had
the better of the argument in slowing down the process to allow for
more deliberation.
Ultimately, however, the second-look doctrine foundered in England because “the veto of the House of Lords was seen more and
more as a substantive impediment,”147 and a partisan tool of Conservatives when they were in opposition to a Labor Government.148
The Parliament Act of 1911 reformed the process and reduced the
power of the House of Lords. That reform most closely parallels
what I believe the two-Congress 29th Amendment would achieve in
providing that “most bills passed by three consecutive sessions of the
Commons would become law without the approval of the Lords.”149
The difference is that our concern is not with sidestepping the approval of the Senate, but with creating a procedure by which it can be
obtained by a simple majority vote. The approval of the House of
146.
147.
148.
149.
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Representatives in the second look would not be sufficient to allow
the bill to pass Congress, but it would end the ability of the upper
chamber to force additional and unusual delay.
Professor Magliocca’s proposal—which would put a time limit of
one year on the filibuster150—seems less clearly inspired by the English Parliamentary history he relates. He argues that his idea is similar
in that England has effectively given “a temporary veto [to] the
House of Lords designed to further discussion while restricting minority obstruction,” and this “would also be the best reform for cloture.”151 In most circumstances, there is nothing in his approach that
actually requires a second look or repassage by the House of Representatives to give a bill any special treatment or change its treatment
in the legislative process, as happens under the Parliament Act of
1911, and under my proposed 29th Amendment.152
With inspiration in both state constitutional provisions requiring
consideration of amendments in two sessions of the state legislature,
and the relationship between the House of Lords and the House of
Commons, each of which reflect the importance of a careful, deliberative legislative process, I am confident that my proposal meets the
objection of self-described filibuster defender Robert Dove, who in
his written testimony before Congress in 2010 posed the question
“whether the solution to addressing . . . abuse of the filibuster is by
tearing down 200 years of Senate history and tradition and throwing
the protections of the minority and the underlying principles of
checks and balances and separation of powers away in the process.”153
By protecting the traditional and historical role of the minority in the
Senate’s balance of power, the proposed 29th Amendment respects

150. Id. at 305.
151. Id. at 323.
152. A second look would only rarely be required in the House of Representatives. It
would occur only when the bill went over to the Senate so late in the Congress that Professor
Magliocca’s one-year filibuster would be sufficient to run out the clock and kill the bill. In that
instance, the “second look” would occur in the next Congress, and, he acknowledges, it would
start the one-year clock running all over again. Id. at 321. Thus, repassage by the House in successive Congresses would be of no moment in the legislative process under his proposal. Under
the 32nd Amendment I have advanced here, it would be the critical step in breaking the power
of the filibuster.
153. Examining the Filibuster, supra note 115, at 65 (written testimony of Robert B.
Dove).
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the concerns Dove raises, while calibrating them for the 21st century
political realities in which the Senate operates.
We need a new balance between the power to get things done in
Congress and the tools given to the minority to restrain the majority.
I have not joined the chorus of those who would simply eliminate the
filibuster, because that goes too far towards pure unrestrained majoritarian authority. Our constitutional framework’s protection for individual154 and minority155 rights provides too much evidence that we
must take care to keep the majority in reasonable check. Though the
balance needs to be modified to take account of the changed circumstances in which we find ourselves, we must not lose sight of the need
to carefully maintain protections for the interests of the minority in
our legislative process as well. By preserving the filibuster in modified
form, the 29th Amendment ensures that the Senate minority retains
bargaining leverage, and critically that it still has the chance to go
back to the country to make principled arguments in defense of the
positions it has taken and win the day—if it can. It is the democratic
solution to the mess Washington has made for our democracy.
Of course, this brings us back to the very same problem we encountered156 when it came to the 28th Amendment. If we have to
count on the very institutions that create obstruction in the first place
to enact reforms, the way forward seems difficult at best, impassable
at worst. Since the Senate and its members seem determined to cling
to the filibuster and the prerogatives it brings, the chances are remote
that they would approve and send on to the states for ratification a
constitutional amendment to substantially limit the filibuster—by a
two-thirds vote, no less.
154. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”).
Just in this partial text of one amendment, the Constitution strips the majority of the power to
compel criminal defendants to provide the testimony that the State might otherwise use to convict them, to use whatever process the majority might wish along the road to take away an individual’s life, liberty, or property, and to take away an individual’s property without compensating him or her.
155. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”) (emphasis added).
156. See supra pp. 118-20 (discussing political obstacles to getting the House to agree to
send a constitutional solution to partisan gerrymandering to the states).
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If there is hope on this score, it can be found in the way the Senate did away with the filibuster for presidential nominations, one step
at a time. First, in 2013, the Senate was in Democratic hands, and the
majority tired of the frequent use by the Republican minority to
block confirmation of executive branch and judicial nominees submitted by President Obama. This led to the dramatically named “nuclear option,” triggered in November of that year by Majority Leader
Harry Reid, to eliminate the use of the filibuster for all presidential
nominations except the Supreme Court.157 However, this was a limited first step, because the move did “not apply to Supreme Court
nominations or to legislation.”158
The next step was not long in coming. When Democrats were
united in their opposition to the nomination of Neil Gorsuch to the
Supreme Court (after Republicans had refused to even hold hearings
for President Obama’s nominee, Merrick Garland, for the same seat
after the death of Justice Antonin Scalia),159 the Senate’s Republican
majority extended the relatively new rule barring filibusters of nominations to the last redoubt: Supreme Court nominations.160
Now that the filibuster no longer operates as a means for the minority to block judicial nominations, there has been some speculation
that the end of the legislative filibuster will not be far behind.161 Of
course, speculation is just that: speculation. There has been no move
to actually enact even filibuster reform when it comes to legislation,
much less abolition. It may indeed be telling that even in a Senate

157. See Paul Kane, Reid, Democrats Trigger ‘Nuclear” Option; Eliminate Most Filibusters on Nominees, THE WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/
politics/senate-poised-to-limit-filibusters-in-party-line-vote-that-would-alter-centuries-ofprecedent/2013/11/21/d065cfe8-52b6-11e3-9fe0-fd2ca728e67c_story.html?noredirect
=on&utm_term=.c9e96a0de7ac.
158. Id.
159. See Harper Neidig, No Hearing for Obama’s Supreme Court Nominee, McConnell
Says, THE HILL (Mar. 16, 2016), http://thehill.com/blogs/blog-briefing-room/news/273230mcconnell-no-hearing-for-garland.
160. See Russell Berman, Republicans Abandon the Filibuster to Save Neil Gorsuch, THE
ATLANTIC, (Apr. 6, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/04/republicans
-nuke-the-filibuster-to-save-neil-gorsuch/522156/ (noting that Democrats had mustered fortyfour votes to deny Gorsuch confirmation, requiring elimination of the filibuster to lower the
number required for confirmation from sixty to fifty-one).
161. Id. (Noting that “some lawmakers were skeptical” of Sen. McConnell’s assurance
that “he would not seek to revoke the 60-vote threshold for legislation,” and were predicting its
ultimate demise).
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where the filibuster, as it applies to nominations, has been first substantially undercut, and then completely eliminated (all since 2013),
no parallel move has occurred when it comes to the legislative filibuster. It is very much a hardy creature, and its utility in stopping legislation remains powerful.
III. CONCLUSION
Intractable problems invite the conclusion that they cannot be
solved. While I stop just short of that pessimistic verdict, the depth of
the dysfunction in both the House and Senate strongly suggest both
that the problem requires powerful and creative solutions, and a way
to get around the maddening problem that these bodies themselves
have to be involved in enacting these solutions. The sobering reality
is that while we can envision ways to fix Congress, as I have attempted to do here, doing so seems a distant goal.
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